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This dissertation delineates the underlying dynamics of the political economy of uneven 
development by focusing on the dynamic interaction between socially produced space, class and 
the state in the context of postcolonial capitalism in Pakistan. The first essay (chapter two) 
focuses on the political economy of urban slums in the context of a postcolonial city of 
Islamabad, Pakistan. It presents a new conceptual framework of ‘expulsionary development’ to 
illustrate that the growth of slums and high-end gated housing enclaves are two sides of the same 
coin at the urban scale. Dispossession and urban sprawl are the underlying factors which mediate 
the processes of uneven urban development. Moreover, the processes of creation, demolition and 
persistence of slums, are explained in the context of Marxian notion of the real subsumption of 
space by capital, i.e. the process of land commodification.  
The second essay (chapter three) makes an intervention in the ongoing debate on the 
theories of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ by centralizing the role of socially produced 
space in mediating the processes of dispossession. Based on the case study of the postcolonial 
Punjab, Pakistan, it is argued that the selective infrastructural policies at a sub-district level can 
viii 
lead to the changes in relative spatiality of places. Places which get the provision of roads are 
more likely to experience the change in land-use from farming to commercial real estate 
activities and this process facilitates the dispossession/eviction of small landholders and 
sharecroppers from the land. Therefore, it is argued that the processes of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ are mediated by the changes in relative spatiality and land-use. 
The third essay (chapter four) builds on Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) theory of the state by 
arguing that the postcolonial state is a ‘site’ of contestation not only from the ‘outside’ but also 
from the ‘inside’.  The internal conflict (i.e. the civil-military contradiction) within the 
postcolonial state of Pakistan manifests in the form of a Punjab-centric hegemonic order which 
marginalizes people from the peripheries (e.g. Balochistan). By synthesizing Resnick and Wolff 
(1987) and Henri Lefebvre (1970), the postcolonial state of Pakistan is characterized by the 
notion of uneven state-spatiality.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ v 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER 
1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 
2. THE SLUM QUESTION AND EXPULSIONARY URBANIZATION: UNDERSTANDING 
THE CREATION, DEMOLITION AND PERSISTENCE OF SLUMS IN PAKISTAN ........... 12 
2.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 12 
2.2 Urban Development and Slums ......................................................................................................... 17 
2.3 Empirical case study of postcolonial Islamabad ................................................................................ 20 
2.3.1 National Housing Policy 2001 .................................................................................................... 21 
2.3.2 Fieldwork in Islamabad .............................................................................................................. 27 
2.4 The ‘Slum-Question’ and Conceptual Framework of Expulsionary Development........................... 28 
2.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 35 
3.RECONCEPTUALIZING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISPOSSESSION: 
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE-GRABBING IN POSTCOLONIAL 
PUNJAB, PAKISTAN .................................................................................................................. 37 
3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 37 
3.2 Theories of Dispossession ................................................................................................................. 40 
3.3 Spatial reconceptualization of the processes of ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ .......................... 44 
3.3.1 Road Networks and Spatiality .................................................................................................... 49 
3.4 A case study of the Postcolonial Punjab, Pakistan ............................................................................ 50 
3.4.1 Household Survey ....................................................................................................................... 52 
3.5 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 58 
4.POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNEVEN STATE-SPATIALITY: CONFLICT, CLASS AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN POSTCOLONIAL STATE OF PAKISTAN .............................................. 60 
4.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 60 
4.2 Dialectical Understanding of the State and Society........................................................................... 63 
4.3 Reconceptualizing the Postcolonial State: A case study of Pakistan ................................................ 68 
4.4 Uneven State-Spaces in Postcolonial Pakistan .................................................................................. 76 
x 
4.5 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 83 
5.CONCLUSION OF THREE ESSAYS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS ........................................ 85 
APPENDICES 
A: The Slum question and Expulsionary Urbanization ................................................................ 90 
B: Political Economy of Dispossession ........................................................................................ 97 
C: Political Economy of Uneven State Spatiality ....................................................................... 100 





LIST OF TABLES 
Table           Page 
2.1 Household Survey Results, Islamabad………………………………………………............28 
3.1 Household Survey Results, Sheikhupura District………………………………………...…53 
4.1 State-Typology and the postcolonial state of Pakistan………………………………….......71 
4.2 Mushtaq Khan’s Framework of Political Settlement ……………………………………….72 
4.3 Conglomerate of Army Welfare Trust……………………………………………….......….75 
A.1 Average Annual Growth rate of selected sectors in Pakistan, 1990-2015………………….91 
































LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure            Page 
 
2.1 Remittances to Pakistan 1980-2018……….…………………………………………………23 
2.2 Outward Expansion of Urban in Islamabad………………………………………………….24 
2.3 Extended Urbanization in Islamabad…………….…………………………………………..25 
3.1 Dispossession/Evictions from Farmland………….…………………………………………54 
3.2 Gated Housing Enclaves in Sheikhupura……………………………………………………56 
4.1 State-Society Dialectic………………………………………………………………………68 
4.2 State-Spatiality in Pakistan………………………………………………………………….78 
A.1 Sector wise share of Pakistan’s GDP, 1950-2016………………………………………….90 
A.2 Cement Output in Pakistan from 1990-2015……………………………………………….92 
A. 3 Gini coefficient in Pakistan, 1963-2002…………………………………………………...92 
A.4 Gini Coefficient in Pakistan, 2005-2015…………………………………………………...93 
A.5 Masterplan of Islamabad……………………………………………………………………93 
A.6 Percentage Increase in Slum Population of selected developing countries, 1990-2010...….94 
A.7 GDP Growth Rate in Pakistan, 1951-2016…………………………………………………95 
A.8 Consumer Price Index Inflation in Pakistan, 1951-2016……………………………...……95 
A.9 Unemployment rate in Pakistan, 1964-2015………………………………………………..96 
A.10 Gated Housing Enclaves in Islamabad…………………………………………………….96 
B.1 Informal Employment as a Percent of Non-Agricultural Employment for  
selected countries, 2010…………………………………………………….……………………97 
B.2 Urban sprawl in Sheikhupura District, Punjab………………………………………..…….99 
C.1 Light Intensity in Pakistan, 1999…………………………………………………..…….....100 
xiii 
C.2 Light Intensity in Pakistan, 2010……………………………………………….…………101 
C.3 Change in Light Intensity in Pakistan, 1999-2010…………………………….…………. 102 


























The consolidation of neoliberal economic policies has brought a myriad number of new socio-
economic transformations in the last four decades (see Banks, Lombard and Mitlin 2020; 
Harriss-White 2018; Kotz 2015; Koechlin 2014; Prasch 2012; Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2010; 
Wolfson 2003).  Most notably, it has accentuated existing socio-spatial and economic inequities1 
(Atkinson 2018; Piketty 2013; Piketty and Saez 2012). This dissertation critically analyzes the 
effect of neoliberal policies by focusing on winners and losers of the processes of development 
in a developing country context. In particular, it delineates the underexplored dimension of space 
and its dynamic interactions with class and institutions in mediating and regulating the processes 
of development. The dissertation identifies new socio-spatial and institutional modalities through 
which advantages and disadvantages associated with processes of development are conferred 
upon different groups in the society based on their spatiality, class position and proximity to the 
state and its resources.  
In neoclassical development economics literature, capitalist development is 
conceptualized as a ‘technical’ rather than a political economic process of reallocation of 
resources from low to high productivity areas of the economy (see Glaeser 2011; Brueckner 
2017; 1990; Vahabi 2009). The manner in which historical, political, social and spatial factors 
mediate reallocation of resources remains largely muted in neoclassical development economics 
literature. In the words of Ha Joon Chang (2010) contemporary (neoclassical) development 
economics literature is like a Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark in comparison to 
 
1 As a consequence, inequality has now become a central political-economic and policy issue 
across the world. 
2 
structuralist and neo-Marxian approaches. As Amartya Sen noted, analyzing socio-economic 
deprivation and inequities in developing countries “requires careful consideration of the nature of 
modes of production and the structure of economic classes as well as their interrelations” (Sen 
1981, 6). This dissertation builds on the Marxian political economy tradition and conceptualizes 
development as a political economic process laden with conflict across multiple dimensions 
including class, gender, race/ethnicity, environment and space. Moreover, this dissertation 
explains the underlying processes of capitalist development by paying attention to socio-spatial 
relations of production2. 
In addition to Marxian political economy literature, the dissertation takes inspiration from 
recent developments in postcolonial urban theory and acknowledges the need of developing 
empirically grounded theoretical concepts in the context of lived experiences of subaltern social 
groups (Goonewardena 2018; Roy 2016, 2015; Brenner and Schmid 2015; Ruddick et al 2018). 
Moreover, the neoliberal regime of accumulation has unleashed substantive changes in the state-
society relationship over the past three to four decades in developing countries. Therefore, it is 
important to continuously examine and refine the prevalent conceptual categories of heterodox 
political economy literature against the backdrop of changing social and political realities in 
developing countries. The refinement process of theoretical constructs has to be a dialectical 
process of continuous back and forth between the theory and the reality to critically analyze the 
blind spots of our own preferred theoretical frameworks. It is in this background that the 
dissertation presents new theoretical constructs to develop a more robust and apt conceptual 
understanding of the key underlying processes of development which perpetuate and exacerbate 
 
2 I analyze how commodities that are being produced and consumed in an economy, including 
socially produce spaces, create winners and losers in the society.  
3 
mass scale deprivation and socio-spatial-economic inequities. This dissertation situates itself in 
the new strand of Marxian political economy literature which centralizes the role of class and 
space to critically analyze processes of urban development in postcolonial countries (see 
Motiram and Vakulabharanam 2018, 2017; Roy 2016; Sheppard 2011).  
 
The manner in which institutional and class structures mediate the processes of development has 
been discussed at length in the heterodox political economy of development literature (see 
Kvangraven 2020; Harriss-White 2018, 2003; Dos Santos 1971; Frank 1972). But one major 
lacuna in this literature is the absence of ‘space’. This dissertation fills the theoretical and 
empirical void in the literature by bringing space to the center-stage. Space was an important 
analytical dimension in Marx’s analysis of capitalist development: 
While capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. 
to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to 
annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from 
one place to another. The more developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the 
market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more 
does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater 
annihilation of space by time (Marx 1857, 472-73). 
 
The dissertation delineates the dynamic interaction among space, class and the state (institution) 
in mediating the key underlying processes of development in a developing country context. The 
significance of ‘space’ and its relationship with ‘class’ and ‘state’ in the processes of capitalist 
development is elaborated at both epistemological and ontological levels. The spatial lens makes 
visible multiple manifestations of uneven development3, i.e. global, national, urban and regional 
(see Smith 2008; Soja 1989, 1980; Massey 1984). Further, in the context of formerly colonized 
 
3 Mandel (1977) noted, “[t]he unequal development between regions and nations is the very 
essence of capitalism, on the same level as the exploitation of labour by capital” (p. 43). 
4 
countries colonial rule also segmented and differentiated society across ‘spatial’ dimensions 
(Azhar 2016a; Mamdani 2012). The dissertation argues in favor of developing a historical-
spatial understanding of class processes and institutional structures in postcolonial societies4. It 
is important to point out here that the dissertation does not argue that spatial dynamics are 
independent of class or institutional structures, rather it argues that space, class and institutions 
are dialectically interlinked and therefore, space should be theorized and empirically analyzed in 
political economic analyses. 
Development economics literature has been primarily focused on temporality of the 
development outcomes, but in recent years the significance of space has been brought to the fore 
in the divergence debate. Therefore, it is important to explain key differences in the 
conceptualization of the space presented in this dissertation vis-à-vis the mainstream 
development economics literature. The divergence debate revolves around three contending 
arguments (Easterly and Levine 2003). One, it is argued that quality of ‘institutions5’ is the 
fundamental cause of development or lack thereof (see Acemoglu et al 2001; Acemoglu et al 
2002). Two, divergence in development outcomes is associated with differences in policy 
choices6 across countries (see Frankel and Romer 1999; Frankel et al 1996). Three, 
‘geography/space’ is regarded as the primary factor in explaining divergent development patterns 
across the world (see Sachs 2001; Diamond 1997).  
 
4 By using historical-spatial lens this dissertation delineates the specific institutional modalities 
through which neoliberal regime of accumulation has impacted processes of development in the 
postcolonial Pakistan. 
 
6 For example, it is argued that neoliberal economic policies such as unrestricted mobility of 
capital, free trade and stabilizing macroeconomic policies can be effective in promoting 
development. International financial institutions (IFIs) like IMF and World Bank are the strong 
proponents of this approach.  
 
5 
Despite sharp differences in these three approaches, they tend to conceptualize space as 
exogenously given backcloth7. For example, settler mortality in Accemoglu et al (2001) and 
geography-centric trade model of Frankel and Romer (1999). Here, I particularly focus on the 
geography camp as it centralizes the role of space. Jeffery Sachs (2001) and Jared Diamond 
(1997) are leading advocates of geography/space camp. They conceptualize space (geography) as 
an exogenously given backcloth. Diamond (1997) referred to geography as a ‘first nature’, i.e. a 
backcloth, which is inherently uneven. In particular, geographical backcloth is a combination of 
the following two attributes: one, differences between the tropical and temperate latitudes and 
second, differences between shape and directional orientation of continents. In other words, 
geography/space is tantamount to biophysical environment in this framework. Similarly, Jeffery 
Sachs (2001) has argued that the most important predictor of economic growth is ‘tropicality’ 
and ‘distance from navigable water’ (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger 1999). The key implication of 
their work is that uneven geographical development on the global scale (North vs. South) is 
primarily rooted in geographical inequities which are exogenously given rather than institutional 
or cultural superiority of some countries vis-à-vis others8. While I find Diamond (1997) and 
Sachs (2001) work useful in dispelling stereotypes against ‘non-western’ cultures, the 
dissertation identifies three major problems in their conceptualization of the ‘space’. One, their 
notion of space is static and it completely discounts the role of production processes, institutional 
 
7 Another major critique on this literature is its Euro-centric approach, i.e. ‘development’ is 
conceptualized in the context of Europe and any difference and deviation from the European 
proto-type is considered ‘backward’ (see Pomeranz 2001; Roy 2016).  
8 According to Diamond (1997) improvements in technology and human migration are likely to 
diffuse more readily between East and West rather than North and South. It is not cultural or 
institutional supremacy of the global North which allowed North to get ahead of global South, 
instead, it is pure luck (exogenously given geography) of the global North.  
 
6 
structures and class processes in the development process. Two, there is no room for the role of 
human agency in their conceptualization of the space, i.e. space cannot be changed or 
reconfigured. Third, it cannot help us explain uneven development outcomes at regional, 
national, sub-national and urban scales as they primarily explain divergence at the global scale.   
Therefore, I go beyond their work and draw from critical human geography literature to 
develop a spatial conceptualization of the processes of development. In sharp contrast to the 
static conception of space, i.e. the exogenously given backcloth, human geography literature 
offers a dynamic understanding of the space. That is, space is socially produced --- ‘created 
space’ --- it is an outcome of social interactions, i.e. the manner in which ‘contextual space’ 
(exogenously given backcloth) is organized, used and interpreted (Soja 1980, 210).  The 
dissertation uses this dynamic notion of socially produced space to analyze the role of class and 
institutional structures in the process of development.   
Socially produced space is a created structure comparable to other social constructions 
resulting from the transformation of given conditions inherent in life-on-earth, in much 
the same that human history represents a social transformation of time and temporality 
(Soja 1980, 210). 
The production of new spaces is embedded in the processes of capitalist development but at the 
same time space regulates processes of development (Harvey 1978; Soja 1980). In other words, 
valorization of capital as a ‘process’ and the accompanying concrete manifestations of class 
struggle do not just occur within created spaces but they are also mediated by created spaces9 
(Soja 1980). Processes of capitalist development induce spatial changes (it can be at local, 
regional, national and/or global scales) and at the same time, changes in organization of space 
 
9 In other words, the production and reproduction of created spaces at ever expanding scales is 
one of the defining features of the processes of capitalist development. 
7 
mediate and regulate the processes of capitalist development, i.e. a socio-spatial dialectic (Soja 
1980). This dissertation provides a grounded understanding of socio-spatial dialectic10.  
In recent years, one of the key socio-spatial manifestations of neoliberal regime of 
accumulation is the rapid expansion of urban spaces in developing countries. As a result, for the 
first time in human history, majority of the people live and work in urban spaces (UN-Habitat 
2016). One of the key implicit assumptions in mainstream development economics theory is that 
urbanization reflects a transition to ‘modernity’ and progress (Glaeser 2014, 2011; Jedweb et al 
2017). This understanding is primarily derived from the urbanization experiences of the Global 
North where industrial revolution allowed these countries to produce large surpluses in the 
agriculture sector with the introduction of new production techniques (Lewis 1954). In the 
expectation of higher wages in the industry, people from rural areas move to urban spaces. This 
rural-urban migration did two things: one, it ensured continuous supply of labor and second, it kept 
a downward pressure on wages in the industry. In the process, industrial capitalists did not only 
amass profits, but they were also incentivized to reinvest their capital to expand the production 
capabilities of their national economies (Lin 1994). Moreover, workers get higher wages in urban 
sectors vis-à-vis agriculture and the latter becomes efficient and modernized. It is against this 
backdrop urbanization is seen as a by-product of industrial development and Pareto optimal in 
neoclassical economic theory (Glaeser 2014). In other words, urbanization is welfare-enhancing 
for all socio-economic classes in society and the magnitude of urbanization is considered a good 
approximation of the level of development in a country (Acemoglu et al 2001).  
 
10 Soja offered an abstract understanding of socio-spatial dialectic but this concept has not been 
delineated in the context of processes of capitalist development in the global South.  
8 
The empirical reality of contemporary developing countries is very different and unique 
vis-à-vis early industrialized countries of the global North. In fact, a large number of developing 
countries (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia) have witnessed ‘urbanization without 
industrialization’ in the neoliberal period (Fox 2014, 2012; Opal 2000). Neoliberal experiences of 
developing countries, barring few exceptions, have defied conventional wisdom that urbanization 
and industrialization go hand in hand11. This dissertation asks the following questions: what are 
some of the key underlying socio-spatial and economic forces that mediate the processes of urban 
development in the neoliberal period? How are slums tied to the processes of urban development? 
How does the dialectic of space-class-institutions collectively mediate and regulate the processes 
of development?  
To answer these questions, the dissertation delves deep into the case of postcolonial 
Pakistan to critically analyze processes of urban development since the advent of neoliberal 
reforms in 1980s. By building on historical and geographical materialism, socio-spatial dialectic 
and space-time structuration, the dissertation presents a new conceptual framework of 
‘expulsionary development’ to understand uneven development at multiple scales: urban, sub-
district and national/state. Expulsionary development framework12 explains how spaces are 
formed (spatial organization and re-organization) and how spaces regulate social relations of 
production in post-colonial Pakistan. In particular, it explains the concrete manifestation of how 
spatiality mediates class processes and institutions (i.e. the postcolonial state). Moreover, the 
framework of expulsionary development delineates uneven development by extending Marx’s 
notion of subsumption of labor to ‘subsumption of space’ by capital. That is, capital extracts 
 
11 China has rapidly industrialized in past four decades.  
12 It explains the complex interplay between economic, political, historical and spatial factors in 
mediating the processes of uneven socio-spatial-state development. 
9 
value by controlling, commanding and commodifying new spaces. On the one hand, 
expulsionary development facilitates capital accumulation and produces affluence through the 
development of gated housing enclaves and new infrastructure. On the other hand, it accentuates 
vulnerabilities and immiseration by dispossessing people from their lands and they are forced to 
live in deplorable living conditions in slum settlements, i.e. underdevelopment. The systemic link 
between accumulation and dispossession is made visible by the framework of ‘expulsionary 
development’.  This allows me to make novel contributions in the heterodox political economy 
of development literature by specifying new institutional modalities through which advantages 
and disadvantages associated with processes of development are conferred to individuals based 
on their class position, spatiality and access to the state13.  
The rest of the dissertation is structured in to following four chapters. The second chapter 
is focused on the political economy of slums. Within heterodox political economy literature, the 
‘slum’ is an understudied topic despite the fact that one in every three urban residents in 
developing countries live in slums settlements (UN 2015). The first chapter uses the framework 
of ‘expulsionary development’ to explain the creation, demolition and persistence of slums 
against the backdrop of uneven urban development. Based on the case study of the postcolonial 
city of Islamabad, the chapter identifies a structural relationship between the expansion of slums 
and growth of new gated housing enclaves for high income households. Building on Marx’s 
original work in Capital, a novel conceptual category of ‘real subsumption of land’ is introduced 
in this chapter, i.e. a process of commercialization and commodification of land. The growth of 
new gated housing enclaves represents a transition towards real subsumption of land as they are 
 
13 The dissertation presents a novel understanding of the processes of uneven development by 
focusing on the dynamic interaction between space, class and the state. 
10 
built at urban peripheries on erstwhile non-commodified land. The process of land acquisition 
involves dispossession of locals and they end up living in slum settlements for their survival. The 
chapter argues that real subsumption of space by capital is the main driving force behind urban 
development in Pakistan14.  
The second chapter makes a new contribution to the ongoing debate on theories of 
accumulation by dispossession (ABD) by drawing from a case study of postcolonial Punjab at a 
sub-district level. It is argued in the chapter that contemporary processes of accumulation by 
dispossession should be understood in terms of spatial reorganization of places. The change in 
land use from farm to commercial real estate is one of the key driving factors behind ABD in 
postcolonial Punjab. In particular, the chapter delineates the role of the state and spatiality in the 
processes of ABD. It is argued that the state plays a much more dynamic role than the 
‘expropriation via declaration of some land as eminent domain’ in the process of ABD because 
state can reorganize and reconfigure spatiality of towns/villages via selective infrastructural 
policy that includes some places and excludes others. The selective infrastructural policy actively 
engineers potential land rents and facilitates speculation on land prices which leads to 
dispossession of the marginalized groups from their land and livelihood and the development of 
new gated housing enclaves on erstwhile farmland.  
In the third chapter, I analyze uneven development at the national scale by focusing on 
the dialectical relationship between the state and society. In order to conceptualize the state, it is 
mandated to demarcate between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ actors to the state. Internal actors 
 
14 Similarly, slum demolitions are also explained through subsumption of space as slum-land is 
cleared for the construction of commercial real estate such as gated housing enclaves. 
Dispossession and displacement of marginalized groups from their land and livelihoods are key 
steps to materialize subsumption of land/space by capital. In other words, the chapter illustrates 
the formation and demolition of slums against the backdrop of subsumption of space by capital.   
11 
include institutions and personnel who constitute the state-apparatus, while, rest of the society 
can be envisaged as ‘external’ to the state-apparatus. By building on Resnick and Wolff (1987), 
the chapter argues that the state is a ‘site’ of contestation from both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’. In the 
case of Pakistan, the internal conflict within the state apparatuses --- military’s disregard of 
constitutionally mandated supremacy of parliament and civilian rule --- plays an important role 
in mediating uneven development at the national scale. The chapter makes a new contribution in 
the Marxian theory of the state by incorporating the dialectic of state’s ‘internal-external’ 
contestation in mediating and regulating the state-society interaction. Moreover, it delineates 
concrete manifestation of the state-society interactions by drawing form Henri Lefebvre’s (1970) 
notion of the state-spatiality. It is argued here that the internal contestation in the postcolonial 
state has led to ‘uneven development of state-spaces’ in Pakistan. That is, to further its economic, 
political and ideological interests, the military has engineered a Punjab-centric hegemonic order 
in which people from the peripheries (Balochistan, rural Sindh and KPK) of the country have 
been marginalized/‘otherized’ from both the state and society. In chapter five, I present the 





2. THE SLUM QUESTION AND EXPULSIONARY URBANIZATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE CREATION, DEMOLITION AND PERSISTENCE OF 




The political economic significance of slums has increased in past three decades due to rapid 
urbanization in developing countries. It is estimated that more than one billion people live in 
slum settlements (UN-Habitat 2016). Development economics literature provides two different 
explanations to delineate the political economy of slums. On the one hand, there is a 
modernization school which argues that the processes of economic growth, especially prospects 
of better jobs in urban centers drive the growth of slums in developing countries (Glaeser 2011). 
It is argued that the formation and growth of slums is a manifestation of ‘modernization’ and a 
pathway to development. On the other hand, New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature 
conceptualizes slums against the backdrop of ‘disjointed development’. That is, the urban 
population growth has outpaced the development of urban institutions which has led to a massive 
rise in slum population (Fox 2014, 2012). Slums reflect the lack of urban development in NIE 
literature.  The debate on political economy of slums between these two schools of thought 
reveal the underlying convergence among them on the notion of ‘development’ as a 
undifferentiated and unvariegated process of socio-economic transformation. This is the point of 
departure for this chapter and it intervenes in the ongoing debate by highlighting the inherent 
uneven nature of the processes of capitalist development. The chapter offers an alternative 
conceptualization of political economy of slums in the context of ‘uneven urban development’ 
rather than ‘development’ or lack thereof it. It renders visible the fact that processes of 
development and under-development are interlinked and mutually mediate and regulate the 
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political economy of slums. The chapter makes two novel contributions to the literature. First, it 
argues that growth in slum settlements can also be an outcome of the expansion of high-end 
gated housing enclaves. In other words, slums (under-development) and gated-housing enclaves 
(development) are two sides of the same coin which are connected through the processes of 
dispossession and capital accumulation. Second, the chapter presents a new conceptual category 
of subsumption of space by capital to explain the underlying relationship between three distinct 
phases in the political economy of slums, namely a) slum creation; b) slum evictions and c) slum 
persistence. 
The empirical section of this chapter is based on the case study of Islamabad (Pakistan). 
Pakistan has one of the highest shares of slum growth in the overall urban growth15 and it is also 
one of the fastest urbanizing countries in South Asia (UN-Habitat 2016). To develop a political 
economic understanding of the slums from the below, I conducted primary fieldwork in 
Islamabad from November 2017 to April 2018. During the fieldwork, the primary household 
data was collected through a stratified random survey in eight slums settlements of Islamabad16. 
The results from the household survey show that seventy nine percent of slum-households at 
urban peripheries are affected by land dispossessions/evictions17. In past two decades, the 
number of new gated housing enclaves have increased by ten times and they are being built 
primarily at urban peripheries of the city. The growth of slums at urban peripheries of Islamabad 
is tied to the expansion of urban ‘formal’ housing sector. The chapter has identified National 
 
15 In 1990 there were ten developing countries in the world which had more than 10 million slum 
households, including Pakistan and Nigeria (UN-Habitat 2013). Among these ten countries Pakistan and 
Nigeria are only countries where slum growth contributed most towards urban growth.   
16 University of Massachusetts Amherst IRB, Federal Wide Assurance # 00003909. 
17 Overall, 52% slum-households reported that they are displaced due to land dispossession for gated 
housing societies.   
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Housing Policy 2001 as a critical juncture which consolidated neoliberal18 reforms in urban land 
and housing sectors of Islamabad. This has dramatically altered the socio-spatiality of Islamabad, 
e.g. urban sprawl has increased by forty percent while forest/farm/common lands have eroded by 
thirty five percent (Butt et al 2012). 
The outward expansion of urban towards peripheries is tied to political economy of land 
and power asymmetries in the society. The peripheral spaces offer large tracts of contiguous land 
which was used by locals for their livelihoods via subsistence farming and husbandry. To build 
new gated housing enclaves, land is acquired by real estate developers in cahoots with local land 
mafias by dispossessing people from their land, homesteads and livelihoods. Dispossessed 
groups of people move into slum settlements for their survival in the absence of affordable 
housing and decent paying jobs. Furthermore, in past two decades, Islamabad has witnessed 
massive inflows of investment in infrastructural development, in particular, new road networks 
(expressway, highways) which have made housing at urban peripheries suitable only for a small 
affluent segment of population who own private vehicles (Haque 2015). In other words, there is 
an obvious class dimension in the creation of gated housing enclaves, it caters to the needs of 
high income households in Islamabad.   
Building on these empirical insights, the chapter proposes a new conceptual framework 
of ‘expulsionary urban development’ which is a combination of two inter-related processes – 
one, the dispossession of marginalized groups from their lands and livelihoods at urban 
peripheries; and two, the commodification of land (real subsumption of land by capital) through 
an outward expansion of the urban. Expulsionary urban development manifests in the form of 
 
18 Market-oriented (also called neoliberal reforms) started in 1990s in Pakistan but due to political 
instability they were restricted to only macroeconomic management. The neoliberal reforms expanded to 
banking, land, housing and other sectors under the military regime of Musharraf in early 2000.  
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urban marginality (dispossession and slums) and urban affluence (gated housing enclaves). I 
argue that the framework of expulsionary urban development can have a wider applicability 
because the urban processes that are visible in Pakistan are applicable to other countries in South 
Asia19.  
The empirical findings of this chapter also lead to some interesting conundrums. That is, 
how has marginalized segments of population able to ‘encroach’ land --- highly priced asset --- 
to build slum settlements? In the existing literature the formation and persistence of slums is 
explained through the prevalence of patron-client20 networks (see Auerbach and Thacil 2018; 
Goodfellow 2016; Marx et al 2015). Whenever, there are incidences of  slum 
demolition/evictions, they are explained as moments where impulses of capital accumulation 
dominates political compulsions (Gillespie 2015). I argue that there is an inherent inconsistency 
in this approach because it tends to see the sphere of ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ in isolation from 
each other and ignores their dynamic interaction.  
To address this apparent puzzle in the literature, the chapter introduces a novel 
conceptual category of subsumption of space by capital in line with Marx’s ([1867]1977) notion 
of ‘subsumption of labor21’. The chapter differentiates between two types of subsumption of 
space: ‘formal’ and ‘real’ subsumption of space22 by capital. The concept of real subsumption of 
 
19 See Leveraging Urbanization in South Asia (2016) by the World Bank. 
20 In developing countries, it is a combination of formal institutions, informal institutions and the given 
distribution of power among social classes that plays a central role in mediating processes and outcomes 
of economic development. In other words, political settlement is an equilibrium condition where an 
institutional structure “creates benefits for different classes and groups in line with their relative power” 
(Khan 2010, 20). The role of informal institutions becomes crucial whenever there is a mismatch between 
formal institutions and the existing distribution of power within a society. 
21 Subsumption of labor refers to the extent to which and the forms in which labor is integrated into the 
process of production of value and surplus value (Das 2012, 180). 
22 I use space and land interchangeably here.  
16 
space implies that land is being commodified/commercialized under the command of capital. 
The notion of formal subsumption of space implies that the land has a ‘potential’ for 
commodification but not commodified yet. The formal subsumption of space can be further 
divided into two sub-categories: a) normal-land and b) wasteland. Normal-land is the one where 
the potential for commodification is ready to be tapped. Wasteland is the one where potential of 
commodification is suspended due to natural, political, cultural and economic factors such as 
exposure to hazardous living conditions, i.e. a land around ravine (nallah) and gutter etc., and/or 
land which is not sanctioned for built-environment such as designated green spaces in city’s 
masterplan.   
It is argued here that slums are primarily built on land which has yet to undergo 
commodification, i.e. land under formal subsumption23 of capital. As mentioned above, not every 
piece of land has equal potential for commodification, in fact, wasteland is less suitable for 
commodification. Therefore, the real estate capital is not interested in acquiring land in general, 
but it wants to capture a particular type of land, i.e. land which can easily be commodified. In 
the case of Islamabad, slums which are built on wasteland are able to persist and survive over 
time because real estate developers are not interested in acquiring the ‘wasteland’ for the time 
being. On the other hand, slums which are built on normal-land under the formal subsumption of 
capital have faced demolition and are under constant threat of evictions vis-à-vis slums built on 
wasteland.  In other words, I argue that the uneven transition from formal to real subsumption of 
 
23 Existing literature only analyzes the ownership of the land whether it is privately owned or publicly 
owned land. The paper argues that differences in types of subsumption of space exist in both publicly and 
privately-owned lands.  
17 
space by capital helps us explain why slums are created at first place, why some of them are 
demolished, while others continue to persist24.  
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section two provides a 
critical review of the ongoing debate on the political economy of slums. In section three, I 
introduce the empirical case study of Islamabad, Pakistan and a new theoretical framework of 
expulsionary urban development. Conclusion is provided in section four.   
2.2 Urban Development and Slums 
 
This section provides a critical overview of the ongoing debate on the political economy of 
slums. According to modernization25 approach, slums are temporary and transitional phenomena 
in the process of urban development (Glaeser 2013). While, building on the urbanization 
experiences of the countries of the global North, the modernization school conceptualizes 
urbanization as a byproduct of industrialization. It is argued that poor rural migrants move to 
urban spaces in hopes of better jobs and they temporarily end up living in slums due to limited 
availability of the affordable housing stock (Brueckner and Selod 2009; World Bank 2009). As 
countries climb up the economic ladder, a large segment of slum residents would be able to 
move out of slums26 (Glaeser 2011; Payne 2005). It is in this context slums are seen as a 
 
24 It can also be referred as a process of uneven commodification of land. 
25 I include neoclassical urban economics literature under the label of modernization. 
26 When confronted by the complexity of the real world in which slums continue to grow and 
persist, urban economics reasons that over-regulated land markets, ‘bad’/ ‘corrupt’ governance 
practices, and rapid population growth are the causes for this phenomenon (see Castells-
Quintana,2017; Brueckner, 2013; Duranton, 2008; Feler and Henderson, 2008; Buckley and 
Kalarickal, 2006; Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky 2007).  
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temporary and unavoidable manifestation of the processes of development (Glaeser 2011; 
Brueckner et al 2019; Brueckner and Selod 2009).  
In contrast to modernization approach, the New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature 
argues that urbanization can take place without industrial or economic development. 
Globalization has made it easy for developing countries to import food and energy needs without 
producing a large amount of surpluses in the agriculture (Fox 2012; Fay and Opal 2000). 
Consequently, many developing countries are witnessing ‘urbanization without industrialization’ 
which leads to formation and growth of slums (see Fox 2014; Marx et al 2013). In other words, it 
is ‘disjointed modernization’, i.e. urban population growth has outpaced economic and 
institutional development in developing countries (Fox 2014, 193). The roots of disjointed 
modernization can be traced back to colonial27 path dependencies which manifest through the 
dominance of landed elites and patron-client networks (Auerbach 2016; Marx et al 2013). 
Moreover, it is argued that the development discourse has an ‘anti-urban’ bias which reflects in 
the priorities of international development organizations and national governments (Fox 2014). 
Therefore, NIE literature argues that slums are manifestation of lack of urban development.  
Despite numerous differences between NIE and modernization approaches, they 
converge on one point, i.e. the inadequate development in the formal housing sector is seen as a 
major cause for the rise of slum settlements. Moreover, the implicit assumption in both 
modernization and NIE literatures is that capitalist development is an ‘antithesis’ of slums. I 
problematize this by drawing from Marxian political economy literature and posit here uneven 
 
27 In the NIE approach, there is no recognition of the ‘agency’ of the postcolonial state and the 
fact that class structure in developing countries has evolved substantially since the advent of 
neoliberal economic reforms (Akhtar 2018; Azhar 2016; Vakulabharanam and Motiram 2012).  
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urban development is the underlying factor in the formation of slums rather than development or 
lack thereof. Marxian political economic literature starting from the seminal work of Engels 
([1872]1969) has emphasized the relationship between processes of capital accumulation, 
urbanization and slums. While building on Engel’s work, Mike Davis (2006, 2004) has argued 
that the neoliberal policy package of financialization, deregulation, withdrawal of subsidies and 
privatization, has led to agrarian distress in countries of the global South. This perpetuates a 
large-scale migration of marginalized segments of population from rural to urban areas (Davis 
2004). At the same time, neoliberal policies has led to ‘premature-deindustrialization’ in many 
developing countries (Rodrick 2015). It is the combination of agrarian distress and premature-
deindustrialization that leads to rapid rates of slum growth in developing countries.  
The recent urban political economy literature has identified another important dimension 
of urbanization in the global south and that is the outward expansion of the urban from its core-
agglomerated center(s). Brenner and Schmid (2015) refer to it as ‘extended urbanization’. It 
encompasses infrastructural development in regions distant from city centers for the operational 
and logistical support for the ever-expanding flows of capital via development of new networks 
of transportation and communication (Brenner and Schmid 2015, 167; Khan and Karak 2018). 
Moreover, to overcome socio-spatial barriers in the way capital accumulation, extended 
urbanization often leads to the “enclosure of land from established social uses in favor of 
privatized, exclusionary and profit-oriented modes of appropriation” (Brenner and Schmid 2015, 
167). This dissertation uses Brenner and Schmid’s (2015) conceptualization of the urban as a 
process is to analyze political economy of slums in developing countries. The processual 
approach towards urban helps us to go beyond the entrenched teleology and “methodological 
nationalism” of standard development models that emphasize the non-contemporaneity of the 
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global North and the South by drawing a parallel between contemporary processes of urban 
development in less developed countries and the phases of urbanization experienced by the 
industrializing countries of Western Europe and North America during the eighteenth, nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries (Khan and Karak 2018). 
2.3 Empirical case study of postcolonial Islamabad  
 
To develop a political economy of slums against the backdrop of uneven urban 
development, I draw from the case study of the postcolonial city of Islamabad, Pakistan. The 
share of slum population in urban population growth is one of the highest in Pakistan (UN-
Habitat 2014). It is estimated that around 46 percent of Pakistan’s urban population lives in 
slums (UN-Habitat 2014). Islamabad is one of the fastest urbanizing cities of Pakistan (PBS 
2018). The total area of Islamabad is 1166 sq. km site which stretches from Margalla hills in the 
North to the vast plain of Pothwar plateau in the west and Southwest (Doxiadis 1965). In the 
original masterplan of the city Islamabad is conceptualized as a ‘dynapolis’, i.e.  a planned 
unidirectional linear city that effectively synthesizes nature and urban form to carve out its 
unique identity (Doxiadis 1965). The masterplan divides Islamabad into six separate zones (see 
figure A.5 in appendix). In terms of the employment, majority of the people work in the so called 
‘informal’ sector in Islamabad (World Bank 2014, 67).   
In both modernization and NIE literatures, the lack of urban planning and colonial path 
dependencies are listed as major factors that can lead to the growth of slum settlements. In this 
context, Islamabad is an interesting case because it is built in the post-colonial28 period (1960s) 
 
28 In this regard, it is somewhat comparable to other major cities of the global South such 
Chandigarh in India and Brasilia in Brazil. I do not mean to argue that colonial path 
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and it is one of the few planned cities in Pakistan (Haque 2015; Hull 2012). As a result, 
Islamabad does not have a direct colonial legacy in terms of its built-environment and 
architecture but indirectly the colonial legacy manifests in in the form of hegemonic role of the 
civil-military bureaucracies in designing and making decisions about the built-environment of 
Islamabad. Although, Islamabad has one of the most advanced urban planning and governance 
institutions in Pakistan, but still it is estimated that around forty-five percent of Islamabad’s 
urban population lives in slum settlements. Therefore, to develop a robust and holistic political 
economic understanding of slums in Islamabad, I go beyond the notions of lack of urban 
planning and bad governance; instead, I focus on the broader regime of urban development that 
facilitates production and reproduction of slums in Islamabad.   
2.3.1 National Housing Policy 2001 
 
Historically, government agencies such as Capital Development Authority (CDA) were primarily 
tasked to develop new residential and commercial land in Islamabad. CDA allocates land 
through multiple mechanism such as lottery-system, housing schemes for low income etc., in 
addition to selling land via market auction. In 2001 there was a major shift in the urban 
development regime in Islamabad through the promulgation of a new National Housing Policy. It 
marked a critical juncture in the processes of urban development because it consolidated the 
neoliberal reforms in urban land markets of Islamabad. I refer to NHP 2001 as a neoliberal 
policy because it envisions privatization, financialization and deregulation as essential 
ingredients for the urban development. NHP 2001 created a major role for “private sector to 
build housing schemes” including new gated housing enclaves by giving fiscal incentives such 
 
dependencies are not relevant in the case of Islamabad but they only figure in indirectly not in 
the form of urban design and city plans.  
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as tax breaks, tax holidays, duty exemptions, and preferential access to credit to real estate 
developers and investors (p. 8). Prior to NHP 2001, house financing was provided by a state-
owned entity House Building Finance Company. NHP 2001 facilitated the financialization of 
urban land and housing sectors by encouraging banks to “float long term bonds at market rates to 
raise housing finance” (p. 9). Moreover, banks were asked to earmark a higher share of 
percentage of their loan portfolio for housing. Interestingly, banks were required to allocate same 
level of loanable funds for housing and industrial projects. Moreover, urban land and housing 
markets were opened up for foreign investors. In particular, investors from Gulf countries 
invested heavily in Islamabad’s land and real estate markets (Haider 2018). These factors 
collectively created a high level of speculation in land markets. To ensure the continuous supply 
of urban land, NHP 2001 removed the “procedural and legal bottlenecks in the [land] 
acquisitions process …which would also minimize litigation” (p.7). Further, the “tenancy laws 
shall be reviewed and rationalized to promote housing through investment” (NHP 2001, p. 10) 
In short, NHP 2001 promoted and facilitated the growth of private gated housing 
enclaves, financialization of urban land markets and empowered the real estate developers to 
dispossess marginalized groups from their land and livelihoods29. Since 2001 Islamabad has 
witnessed a rapid growth in the high-end formal housing in the form of new gated housing 
enclaves. The number of private gated housing enclaves has increased by seven and half times. 
One of the key sources of demand for plots (land) in gated housing enclaves is Pakistani diaspora 
in Gulf countries and Europe and North America. This reflects in the substantial increase in 
remittances in past two decades (see figure 2.1).  
 
29 NHP 2001 is in line with global trends where neoliberal reforms have led to gentrification, 
financialization and speculative bubbles in real estate sector. 
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Figure 2.1. Remittances to Pakistan 1980-2018 
 
Author’s own calculation based on World Bank data 
The rapid growth in the gated housing enclaves has dramatically changed the spatiality of 
Islamabad by perpetuating urban sprawl as they are primarily built at urban peripheries of the 
city. In other words, the growth of new gated housing enclaves are the key driving force behind 
the extended urbanization in Islamabad. GIS estimates show that the built-up environment in 
Islamabad has increased at an astonishing rate of 2.6 percent per year since 1998 (Butt et al 
2012, 110). From 1998 to 2009, 5.09 sq. km per year is added in the built-up area of Islamabad, 
while 5.45 sq. km per year of farm and forest land has been lost (see figures 2.2 and 2.2). 
Similarly, the night light intensity data shows that Islamabad has undergone a rapid urban sprawl 
























Figure 2.2. Outward Expansion of Urban in Islamabad 
Islamabad in 1998 Islamabad in 2009 
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Figure 2.3. Extended Urbanization in Islamabad 




Land for new gated housing enclaves is acquired by dispossessing people. Incidences of 
reported land dispossession/evictions have increased substantially since 2001. It can be argued 
that such an enormous increase might be driven by improved faith of people on the judicial 
system. Based on my interviews with lawyers in Islamabad who have been practicing for 
decades, they were of the opinion that confidence of people on judicial system has relatively 
improved since the 2007-08 lawyers’ movement. So it is a possibility that marginalized groups 
of people are now more likely to pursue litigation against land dispossession. But at the same 
time, they concurred with the prevailing perception that the land mafia (qabza group associated 
with real estate development) has become stronger in recent years (see Ali 2019).  
Dispossessed segments of the population have to find shelter somewhere to survive. 
Given the shortage of affordable housing stock, so, the question is where do they live? Slum 
settlements absorb the dispossessed population. It is estimated that slum population double every 
five year in Islamabad30 (Hussain 2015). Given the limited space in city center, the new slum 
growth is primarily taking place at urban peripheries. Thus, urban peripheries are witnessed two 
distinct types of settlement growth: gated housing enclaves and slums. These two apparently 
contradictory outcomes are mediated by the prevailing neoliberal regime of urban development.  
It is possible that slums are being built at urban peripheries to avail better employment 
opportunities offered by the gated housing enclaves. To better understand the political economy 
of slums and to develop a picture from the below, I did primary fieldwork in slum settlements of 
Islamabad.   
 
30 Slum population growth rate is fourteen percent per year in Islamabad. By using the rule of 70, 
I arrived at 5 years for slum population to double.  
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2.3.2 Fieldwork in Islamabad 
 
Slum household survey was conducted between November 2017 and April 2018. I used two-
stage stratified random sampling technique to select slum settlements and households. In the first 
stage, eight settlements were selected based on stratification across spatiality, i.e. center and 
periphery.  In the second stage, I randomly selected 50 households from each settlement. The 
total sample consists of 400 households (200 slums households were located at urban-center and 
other 200 were at urban periphery). I collected data31 on where they lived before and what were 
main factors that led them to a slum. Overall results show that fifty-two percent of slum-
households are affected by the dispossession. But there is a spatial pattern in the results, i.e. 
seventy-nine percent of slum households located at urban peripheries are affected by land 
dispossessions. Interestingly, only eleven percent of slum households at peripheries have a job 
related to gated housing enclaves. These micro-level findings point towards the fact that 











31 Data was also collected on demographic, socio-economic, gender and clientelist networks.   
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Context    
Avg. slum HH size 6 7 6.5 






Outcome    
% of HHs moved to slums after 2001? 20% 81%  50.5% 
% of HHs dispossessed from land due to 
construction of new gated housing enclaves? 
 
25% 79% 52% 
% of HHs work in gated housing enclaves 2% 11% 6.5% 
Observations (200) (200) (400) 
 
2.4 The ‘Slum-Question’ and Conceptual Framework of Expulsionary Development 
 
The empirical findings of this research identify a new channel through which slum growth can be 
understood, i.e. the growth in slums is tied to the growth of high-end formal housing sector. But 
at the same time these empirical insights pose an interesting puzzle for the urban political 
economy literature. That is, if marginalized groups are dispossessed from land at first place then 
how come they are allowed to ‘encroach’ some other land (slums)? To answer this puzzle, I 
introduce a novel conceptual category of subsumption of space by capital by drawing from 
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Marx’s ([1867]1977) notion of subsumption of labor32 by capital. Subsumption of space reflects 
the extent and the forms in which space is integrated into the processes of capital accumulation. 
Mizuoka (1991) is arguably the first one who invoked the term subsumption of space into the 
society. But Mizuoka (1991) did not provide analytical clarity on the difference between formal 
and real subsumption of space33. To best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
systemically elaborate and apply the notion of subsumption of space to understand processes of 
urban development. I differentiate between two different types of subsumption of space by 
capital, namely, formal subsumption of space and real subsumption of space. The real 
subsumption of space implies that land is being commodified. The formal subsumption of space 
means that land has a potential but it is not yet commodified. Formal subsumption of land 
(space) can be further divided into two sub-categories: a) normal-land under formal subsumption 
and b) wasteland under formal subsumption. Normal-land is the one where potential for 
commodification is ready to be tapped. Wasteland is the one where potential of commodification 
is temporarily suppressed and suspended due to natural, political, cultural and economic factors 
 
32 Marx ([1867]1977) divided subsumption of labor into two main forms: formal subsumption of labor by 
capital and real subsumption of labor by capital. The real subsumption of labor refers to the labor process 
in which relative surplus value is produced and appropriated, by use of technology. Formal subsumption 
of labor refers to the labor process in which absolute surplus value is produced. That is, extending 
working hours, paying low wages and etc. In Chapter 16 of Volume 1 of Capital, Marx also talked about 
a third possible form called hybrid subsumption of labor, i.e. it refers to the labor processes in which 
wage labor is not used, instead, surplus appropriation takes place via rents, usury and so forth. Petty 
commodity production and self-employment would fall under this category (see Marx 1977; Das 2012).  
33“The process of incorporating pristine space with all its attributes into the pristine, “one-point” concept 
of human society and the emergence of concomitant contradiction-laden social processes may be termed 
the formal subsumption of space…Human society having subsumed pristine space then transforms it into 
configuration of socio-economic space, suitable for the operation of human society, through intentional 
applications of labour and science and technology and, the creation of new social relations. The latter are 
processes towards the real subsumption of space into society” (Mizuoka 1991,72). Similarly, Buck (2007) 
has also invoked the term subsumption of space as an alternative to the notion of primitive accumulation 
but does not differentiate between formal and real subsumption of space.  
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(e.g. land around ravine and gutter etc. and/or land which is not earmarked/sanctioned for any 
construction such as designated green spaces in city’s masterplan).  
Neil Brenner (2018) forwarded the notion of ‘planetary urbanism’ to highlight the 
globalized socio-spatial hegemony of the capital, building on this I argue that every land under 
capitalism is at least under formal subsumption of capital. Therefore, one of the key analytical 
categories to conceptualize urban processes is to differentiate between different types of 
subsumption of space by capital. In a developing country like Pakistan where community 
ownership of land, subsistence farming and government ownership of land is prevalent, it is 
imperative to note that processes of capital accumulation imply brining in new land under the 
command and control of capital which leads to transition from formal to real subsumption of 
space by capital. In other words, it is not simply the change in land ownership that needs to be 
closely examined but the change in land-use can also have substantive political economic effects 
on the local economy.  
In the case of Islamabad, the transformation of erstwhile farm land into private gated 
housing enclaves is a manifestation of transition from formal subsumption to real subsumption of 
space by capital. Dispossession is the key intermediary process to achieve the real subsumption 
of land. Dispossessed groups of people move into slum settlements which are built on the land 
which is under the formal subsumption of capital, i.e. the land is yet to be commodified, and this 
explains why marginalized groups are able to build new slums at urban peripheries. But then 
how can we explain the demolition of slums? To answer this question, it is important to note that 
capital is not interested in acquiring land in general, but it is interested in acquiring a particular 
type of land, i.e. the one that can undergo real subsumption. Every piece of land (normal-land vs. 
wasteland) is not suitable for commodification. Slums that are built on the wasteland (formally 
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subsumed land) tend to persist and avoid evictions due to major obstacles in the way of real 
subsumption of land. For example, environmental/spatial constraints (e.g. slum-land is exposed 
to hazardous environment, nallahs, gutters, etc.), legal obstacles (e.g. masterplan of the city does 
not allow construction of any new built-environment on that particular location) and/or political 
barriers like patron-client networks. The following quote from one of the slum-residents in 
Islamabad is very illuminating in this regard: “we know the unhygienic environment (living 
around the rain channel) is not suitable for living and we do not appreciate this hostile 
environment but we have to live here, might be forever as we cannot afford sky-scraping house 
rents” (see Ahmad 2018).  
Therefore, I argue that it is not a coincidence that slums which continue to persist over 
time in Islamabad are the ones which are located on the wasteland under formal subsumption of 
capital. On the other hand, slums which are built on normal-land are often demolished or they are 
likely to be demolished to pave way for the real subsumption of land by capital. It is important to 
note that existing literature explains slum persistence and slum evictions in terms of the patron-
client networks within slums (see Auerbach 2017, 2016; Shami and Majid 2014). While, I 
acknowledge the significance of patron-client networks (they can act as one of the barriers in the 
way of real subsumption of land) but patron-client networks are not sufficient to explain 
processes of slum formation, persistence and evictions without incorporating the processes of 
subsumption of land by capital. To further substantiate this claim, I make use of a quasi-natural 
experiment setting in Islamabad. In April 2019 a slum settlement in E-12 Islamabad was 
demolished. E-12 settlement was not included in the slum-household survey that I conducted but 
a nearby Y-12 (this is an alias name to protect anonymity of the settlement) settlement was 
included in it.  I acquired the basic information about E-12 settlement such as its legal status and 
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type of land on which it is built from the local government office and by visiting the site. Both E-
12 and Y-12 settlements are ‘non-notified34’. Moreover, both settlements were built on 
government owned land. Now, the puzzle is why E-12 was demolished and not Y-12, despite 
both were non-notified and built on the state-land? To address this, I make use of the slum 
household data from Y-12 settlement, in particular the data on patron-client networks. I draw 
from Auerbach (2016) to develop a quantifiable measure of patron-client networks.  
Political Party Density Network = [P/Si (population)] *500 
P is the number of party workers live in a slum Si. To capture the presence of multiple political 
parties, I calculated party representation balance by drawing from Auerbach (2016). 
 Party Representational Balance = [(1/Σpj) – 1] 
p is the proportion of workers in a slum from party j. For example, if there are only two political 
parties in a slum. The party representational balance score of 0 would represent total dominance 
of one party in a slum, whereas score of 1 would represent equal representation of both parties in 
a slum. The major constraint is that I only have data on Y-12 settlement but interestingly Y-12 
settlement did not have any clientelist35 networks or political parties’ membership36. Therefore, 
theoretically E-12 cannot have worst patron-client networks/party representational balance than 
Y-12. If we assume the worst case scenario in E-12, even then patron-client networks cannot be 
the differential factor between two settlements. Therefore, I infer that it is not the varying degree 
 
34 Notified slums are the ones whose existence is ‘officially’ recognized by the government and they have 
relatively ‘better’ tenure security as compared to non-notified slums whose existences is not officially 
recognized by the government 
35 I used Aurebach (2016) measure of clientelist networks.  
36 One potential criticism of this approach would be that patron-client networks can never be 
fully quantified.  
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of clientelist networks that can help us explain why E-12 settlement was demolished and Y-12 
continue to persist.  
To answer the puzzle of demolition and persistence of slums, it is imperative to focus on 
the notion of subsumption of space (land) by capital. In the case in hand, the land on which E-12 
settlement was built has been recently sanctioned for a commercial housing project. In contrast, 
the Y-12 settlement is built around nallah (gutter) and is not considered ‘suitable’ (at least for the 
time being) for commercial real estate. In other words, both slums were built on the land which 
was under ‘formal subsumption of capital’, but E-12 settlement was built on the ‘normal-land’ 
while Y-12 is built on the wasteland37. This illustrates that transition from formal to real 
subsumption of land by capital is the key driving force behind slum demolition in Islamabad.  On 
the other hand, the persistence of a slum implies that there are major obstacles (geographical, 
legal, political etc.) in the way of undertaking real subsumption of land. The process of transition 
from formal to real subsumption of land is inherently uneven and variegated across places.  
I argue that three distinct phases in the political economy of slums, namely, slum-
formation, slum-demolition and slum-persistence are interconnected by processes of 
subsumption of land by capital. I refer to these three phases in totality as the ‘slum-question’. It 
is argued here that the ‘slum question’ can be best understood in terms of the uneven transition 
from formal to real subsumption of space by capital and it is mediated and regulated by the 
prevailing regime of uneven urban development: ‘expulsionary urban development’.  
 
37 Desai and Loftus (2013) study shows that tenure security of slum-households decreases when 
the surrounding area receives infrastructure and public goods investments. I argue that this also 
points to the fact that as neighboring area receives more investment slum-land given it is normal-
land under formal subsumption provides attractive opportunity for capital to undertake real 
subsumption.   
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Expulsionary urban development is a combination of two interconnected processes. One, 
the outward expansion of urban spaces (sprawl) and the commodification of land (development 
of new gated housing enclaves). The framework of expulsionary urban development makes it 
visible that contemporary urbanization in a country like Pakistan is mediated by the capital’s 
drive to undertake real subsumption of space. Capital valorizes itself by bringing in new land 
under its command and by commodifying it. The commodification of land requires not just 
change in the land ownership but it also requires change in land-use from subsistence farm or 
forest to commercial real estate use, i.e. production of new gated housing enclaves. To facilitate 
this transition, new infrastructure including road networks and public goods are provided around 
the newly captured land and this creates an internal ecosystem of the extended urbanization38 
(urban-sprawl).  
Two, dispossession of people from their land, livelihoods and demolition of slums. 
Saskia Sassen (2014) argued that under neoliberal regime of accumulation people are not just 
dispossessed from their land but they are also expulsed39 from the safety nets and formal sectors 
of the capitalist economy. In fact, capital is primarily interested in acquiring land (and other 
natural resources) rather than hiring wage-labor to produce manufactured goods. This makes 
contemporary processes of dispossession distinct from what Marx ([1867]1977) envisaged as 
‘primitive accumulation’. For Marx ([1867]1977) primitive accumulation was the combination 
of the following two processes - first, separation of producers from the means of production, i.e. 
 
38 Urban sprawl leads to environmental degradation that requires a chapter on its own.   
39 This makes the expulsed segments of society qualitatively distinct from Marx’s (1977) reserve 
army of labor. The reserve army of labor refers to those workers that are unemployed by the 
rising organic composition of capital (Harriss-White 2018). Sassen (2010) argued that the 
‘developmental’ state under Keynesian/Fordist regime of accumulation was focused on the 
inclusion of people as workers and consumers into the ambit of formalized (industrial/urban) 
economy. 
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dispossession of peasants, artisan and petty commodity producers; and second, proletarianization 
of the dispossessed. In contemporary expulsionary urban development, dispossessed groups are 
absorbed by slums and petty-commodity production. “Slum remains as a fully franchised 
solution to the problem of warehousing the twenty-first century’s surplus humanity” (Davis 
2008, 28). In other words, slums are playing an integral role in reproducing the prevailing regime 
of expulsionary urban development by absorbing the dispossessed groups of people.  
In short, expulsionary urban development manifests in the form of two interlinked 
outcomes: gated housing enclaves (development) and creation-demolition of slums (under-
development). As a result, urban inequality has been exacerbated under the prevailing regime of 
urban development as it has created silos of urban affluence (gated housing enclaves) while 
pushing a large segment of population towards a life of perpetual immiseration and insecurity.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has made new contributions in the existing urban political economy literature 
through the case study of Islamabad, Pakistan. First, it has illustrated that slums can be best 
understood against the backdrop of ‘uneven urban development’ rather than ‘pathway’ to 
development or ‘lack thereof’. The chapter has identified a stark manifestation of socio-spatial 
inequities in the form of simultaneous expansion of slums and gated housing enclaves in 
Islamabad. For the marginalized groups of people expulsionary urban development implies 
dispossession and constant threat of displacement/evictions. On the other hand, expulsionary 
urban development provides state of the art exclusive consumption spaces (gated housing 
enclaves) for the affluent segments of the society. Dispossession and displacement of 
marginalized groups is the key intermediary process that links slums with the gated housing 
enclaves. Generally, the processes of dispossession has been thought in terms of slum-
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eviction/demolitions whereas this chapter has shown that dispossession also plays a central role 
in the growth of slums. This is contextualized against the backdrop of neoliberal regime of 
accumulation in the urban sector which was consolidated through the National Housing Policy 
2001.  
Second, the chapter has presented a new conceptual framework of expulsionary urban 
development to understand the processes of uneven development at the urban scale. Building on 
the original works of Marx, the chapter introduced a novel conceptual category of ‘real 
subsumption of space’ by capital, i.e., a process of commercialization and commodification of 
new land, as the underlying dynamic behind expulsionary urban development. The growth of 
new gated housing enclaves represents a transition towards real subsumption of space as they are 
built at urban peripheries on erstwhile non-commodified land by dispossessing people. Similarly, 
the slum demolitions are also a manifestation of the transition towards real subsumption of space 
as the newly acquired slumland is used for commercial real estate projects. It is argued that the 
persistence of slums over time can be best explained due to significant socio-spatial obstacles in 
the way of materializing real subsumption of space by capital. In other words, the chapter has 
illustrated that the processes of slum-formation, slum-demolition and slum-persistence are 




3. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DISPOSSESSION: 
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND VALUE-GRABBING IN 
POSTCOLONIAL PUNJAB, PAKISTAN 
 
 3.1 Introduction 
 
The neoliberal period has witnessed a rapid commercialization and commodification of land 
across countries of the global South (Sassen 2014). This process, which is driven by the influx of 
investments towards private real estate, the creation of special economic zones and IT 
(information technology) parks, is seen by official development narratives as being synonymous 
with economic development and efficiency. Yet, as a growing body of literature points out, the 
dark side of the same process is that it is associated with dispossession, evictions of landless 
peasants, land-grabbing, and the destruction of the environment and community-based property-
rights: accumulation by dispossession (ABD). An appreciation of the mechanics of ABD---why 
and when it becomes necessary, how intra and inter class struggles in a society shape its 
direction, and what role the state plays in facilitating the process--- have become central to 
understanding the political economy of development in countries of the global south. In 
particular, this chapter addresses why and how land dispossession becomes necessary, useful and 
possible at the particular time and space for the processes of capital accumulation? 
Enclosures and dispossession are nothing new in the history of capitalism, in fact, they 
played an instrumental role in the industrialization and urbanization of the countries of the global 
North. Marx (1867[1977]) envisaged ‘dispossession’ as antecedent to the rise of capitalism in 
Europe. Rosa Luxemburg (1913[1951]) was the first to argue that dispossession can be ongoing 
process because capital always requires non-capital to realize its expansion. Building and 
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expanding on Luxemburg’s work, David Harvey (2003) marked a significant departure from the 
‘historicist’ and ‘teleological’ understanding of the processes of dispossession by forwarding the 
theory of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as a defining characteristic of the neoliberal 
capitalism. According to Harvey’s framework, dispossession is useful for capital because it 
releases “a set of assets (including labor-power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. 
Over-accumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable 
use” (Harvey 2003, 149). An important point is that Harvey (2005) did not see dispossession as 
an extra-economic process, instead, he emphasized that his theory of ABD is ‘primarily 
economic rather than extra-economic’ and ‘is most importantly exercised through the credit 
system and financial power’ (p. 159).  
In recent years, Michael Levien (2018) has criticized Harvey’s theory of ABD for 
conflating extra-economic coercion with economic processes. As a redressal Levien (2018, 
2012) has reconstructed the theory of ABD based on the following two characteristics: one, the 
‘extra-economic coercion’ by the state and two, the absence of developed rural land markets. 
Levien (2011) redefines ABD as a “political process through which the state’s coercive power is 
deployed to make a key condition of production – land – available for capital in a context where 
increasing demand confronts the barrier to accumulation represented by … incomplete capitalist 
rural land markets” (p. 457). In other words, Levien’s (2014, 2012, 2011) reconstruction of 
Harvey’s theory of ABD is centered on the role of markets, i.e. the absence of developed land 
markets push capitalists to go to the state who acquires land on their behalf through coercive 
tools. Levien conceptualizes the state as the ‘land-broker’ in developing countries. He 
differentiates ABD from the processes of expanded reproduction via the presence of ‘extra-
economic coercion in the former.   
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This chapter intervenes in this debate by drawing from a case study of Sheikhupura 
district in the postcolonial Punjab, Pakistan. Levien’s (2018, 2012) reconstruction of Harvey’s 
theory of ABD is problematized and it is argued that the state plays a much more dynamic role 
than the ‘expropriation via declaration of some land as eminent domain’ in the process of ABD. 
The state actively engineers potential rents and facilitates speculation via selective infrastructural 
policy that includes some places and excludes others. To empirically illustrate this point, the 
chapter uses the construction of a motorway from Islamabad to Lahore as a quasi-natural 
experiment setting. It allows us to analyze the processes of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
across connected and isolated villages (connected villages have a linked road which connects 
them with the motorway, whereas, isolated villages don’t have a linked road). The empirical 
findings reveal that connected villages have witnessed higher incidences dispossession vis-à-vis 
isolated villages after the construction of motorway, despite sharing similar socio-economic and 
demographic profile. This points to the fact the state’s infrastructural policy, in particular the 
development of roads, is a key intermediating factor that is undertheorized in the existing 
literature on ABD.  
It is argued in this paper that the state’s selective infrastructural policies that include 
some places and excludes others, mediate and regulate the processes of dispossession. Connected 
villages have undergone rapid growth in the commercial rea estate sector, i.e. gated housing 
enclaves, since the construction of the motorway. The construction of new gated housing 
enclaves requires the change in land-use from farm to commercial real-estate which mandates 
dispossession and evictions of small landowning peasants and landless sharecroppers from the 
farmland. The chapter illustrates that dispossession and development are two sides of the same 
coin under the neoliberal regime of accumulation. In other words, the higher incidence of 
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dispossession in connected villages’ vis-à-vis isolated villages is not because that the latter had 
more ‘developed’ land markets as compared to the former. Instead, the dispossession in the 
former has to do with the change in the relative-spatiality of the connected villages as compared 
to isolated villages, i.e. the former became more suitable for the commercial real estate activities. 
Therefore, the chapter emphasizes the role of the prevailing neoliberal regime of accumulation --
- ‘expulsionary development40’ --- which is centered on the commodification of new spaces to 
extract rents41.  
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section two provides a 
critical overview of the theories of dispossession. In section three, I argue that the socio-spatial 
framework of ‘expulsionary development’ is apt to analyze the processes of dispossession in the 
contemporary regime of accumulation. In particular, it emphasizes the role of space in mediating 
the processes of dispossession. The empirical case study of the Sheikhupura district in the 
postcolonial Punjab, Pakistan is provided in section four and section five concludes the chapter.  
3.2 Theories of Dispossession  
 
In political economy literature, the significance of dispossession in the processes of capitalist 
accumulation was first highlighted by Marx (1867). Dispossession created the preconditions for 
the rise of industrial capitalism in Western Europe, Marx referred to it as primitive accumulation, 
a ‘historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’ (Marx 1867, 875). 
Primitive accumulation was combination of the following two processes. One, the separation of 
 
40 I have explained this concept in detail in chapter one.   
41 On the issue of differentiating between ABD and expanded reproduction, this paper argues that 
privatization and/or commodification of previously non-commodified assets through economic 
and/or extra-economic power is the defining feature of ABD. Whereas, expanded reproduction 
engages with already privatized and/or commodified assets to accumulate. 
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non-capitalist producers from the means of production, i.e. dispossession of peasants, artisan and 
petty commodity producers. Two, the proletarianization of the dispossessed segments of 
population. While building on Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation, David Harvey (2003) 
proposed the theory of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (ABD) as the ongoing process of 
capitalist development. Harvey marked a departure from the historicist conceptualization of 
primitive accumulation; he argued that ABD is not an aberration from the ‘normal’ processes of 
capitalist development but an integral component of it as it resolves crises of over-accumulation 
of capital42. An important point to note here is that ABD does not necessarily involve extra-
economic coercion in Harvey’s framework, it can also take place through the processes of 
voluntary market exchange. Harvey emphasized that ABD is ‘primarily economic rather than 
extra-economic’ and ‘is most importantly exercised through the credit system and financial 
power’ (Harvey, 2006: 159). The following four are identified by Harvey (2005) as the critical 
moments of ABD: privatization and commodification of previously non-commodified assets, 
financialization, the management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions of wealth 
from the poor to the rich (p. 160-165).  
Harvey’s theory of ABD has faced criticism43 in recent years for being too broad and 
vague. It is argued that the diverse array of political economic processes ranging from sub-prime 
mortgage crisis in the US during 2000s to land grabs in Africa and Asia are all put under the 
 
42 He envisages ABD as a capital’s response to resolve crises of over-accumulation by releasing 
“a set of assets (including labor-power) at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. Over-
accumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use” 
(Harvey, 2003: 149). Harvey (2010, 2005) delineated his theory of accumulation by 
dispossession at the global scale as a response 
43 De Angelis (2007) and Gillespie (2015) have highlighted the limitations of Harvey’s theory of 
ABD by pointing out that dispossession may not necessarily take place due to the crisis of 
overaccumulation but rather due to constraints/limits to capital posed by communal forms of 
production such as collective farming and urban communes. 
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rubric of ABD by David Harvey. Consequently, the differentiation between expanded 
reproduction and ABD has blurred in Harvey’s framework. Moreover, Harvey’s emphasizes on 
economic alongside extra-economic processes is problematized on the grounds that it dilutes the 
analytical power of the concept of ABD44 (Levien 2012; Glassman 2006). To address these 
shortcomings, Michael Levien (2018, 2012, 2011) has reformulated Harvey’s theory of ABD 
around two things. One, the absence of developed rural land markets and two, the role of the 
‘extra-economic coercion45’ by the state (Levien 2012). According to Levien, his reformulation 
makes the theory of ABD analytically clearer and more useful for the concrete case studies of the 
global south. Levien (2012, 2011) differentiated ABD from the expanded reproduction via the 
presence of extra-economic coercion in the former. 
Accumulation by dispossession is a political process through which the state’s coercive 
power is deployed to make a key condition of production – land – available for capital in 
a context where increasing demand confronts the barrier to accumulation represented by 
… incompletely capitalist rural land markets (Levien 2011, 457).  
 
This chapter problematizes the two central tenants of Levien’s reconstructed theory of ABD46.  
To begin with, it is worth mentioning that Levien (2014, 2012, 2011) does not provide a clear 
definition47 of ‘extra-economic coercion’ despite the fact that it is the central tenet of his 
 
44 Another major shortcoming in Harvey’s framework is that it conflates expanded reproduction 
and ABD (Levien 2012; Glassman 2006). I argue that the process of commodification of 
previously non-commodified assets, in particular land, separates ABD from expanded 
reproduction. I plan to address this issue at length in a separate paper.  
45 Levien marked a departure from Harvey’s theory of ABD by emphasizing on “the use of extra-
economic coercion to expropriate means of subsistence, production or common social wealth for 
capital accumulation” (Levien 2011, 457).   
46 I find merits in some of the points raised by Levien, in particular, the lack of analytical clarity 
between ABD and expanded reproduction in Harvey’s framework.  
47 It can be argued invoking eminent domain is extra-economic by the state but as Levien (2012) 
acknowledges that private parties (land mafias/local influential) also engage in extra-economic 
coercion, and it becomes more tricky to separate economic from extra-economic among private 
party transactions.  
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theoretical reformulation of the theory of ABD. Especially, given the fact that differentiation 
between economic and extra-economic coercion is blurry in countries of the global south 
because of the following two reasons. One, the state operates in the realm of exceptions and 
discretion, i.e. state officials use discretion to confer advantages and disadvantages. Ananya Roy 
(2009) has referred to this as ‘informality’ of the postcolonial state. Second, informal 
institutional mechanisms are used for economic transactions and the threat of violence is often 
used to enforce voluntary contracts (see Banks, Lombard and Mitlin 2020; Auerbach 2018; Khan 
2010; Chatterjee 2008). Therefore, I argue that Levien’s emphasis on ‘extra-economic coercion’ 
as the defining aspect of ABD needs to be critically evaluated.  
Moreover, Levien assumes that capitalists are unable to acquire land through voluntary 
exchange due to the absence of ‘developed’ rural land markets. Therefore, the state has to 
undertake acquisition of land on the behalf of capitalists by using its coercive apparatus. The key 
point that is underemphasized in Levien (2018) is that dispossession allows capitalists to acquire 
land below market prices, and this is the whole point of dispossession. Moreover, the role of the 
state is nothing more than that of a land-broker in Levien’s framework. I argue that this 
underplays the agency of the state in the processes of dispossession. The role of the state is much 
more expansive than simply being a ‘land-broker’. I argue that the state plays a much more 
dynamic role in the processes of ABD. In particular, it actively engineers potential rents and 
facilitates speculation via selective infrastructural policy that includes some places and excludes 
others. Road networks are particularly important as connectivity is associated with the increase 
in prices of land, and hence the potential rents and speculative gains that can be derived through 
commercialization/commodification of land. Thus, a focus on the patterns of road networks 
(infrastructural policy of the state) can reveal potentially crucial insights into explaining why 
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capital may be incentivized to acquire land through dispossession at the first place. In other 
words, the state’s infrastructural policy, in particular the development of roads, is a key 
intermediating factor in the processes of dispossession, and this has not been fully theorized in 
the context of ABD. 
3.3 Spatial reconceptualization of the processes of ‘Accumulation by Dispossession’ 
 
Kaylan Sanyal (2007) posited that postcolonial capitalism is an amalgamation of primitive 
accumulation and ‘welfare governmentality’ (reversal of dispossession). That is, capital in search 
of its expansion, dispossess people from their land/livelihoods and engulfs the productive assets 
(land) under its command. To mitigate some of the negative effects of dispossession, the state 
jumps in to ensure reproduction of the dispossessed population (surplus humanity) by allowing 
them to squat and trade without legal permission. These marginalized groups may also receive 
small amounts of redistribution payments from the state, this is what referred to as the 
‘welfarism’ of the postcolonial state. Sanyal conceptualized ‘welfare governmentality’ in the 
context of Foucault’s notion of governmentality which is sharply distinct from the ‘benevolence’ 
of the state towards the marginalized groups. Foucauldian notion of the governmentality is the 
process through which the state and the individual (citizen) co-determine reproduction of each 
other. Foucault (1993) noted that “governing people is not a way to force people to do what the 
governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between 
techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or 
modified by himself” (p. 203-204). The marginalized groups (dispossessed) and the state 
negotiate and bargain with each other through the complex web of patron-client networks 
(Sanyal 2007; Chatterjee 2008). The key point here is that dispossession is not followed by the 
proletarianization in the postcolonial capitalism. 
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Similarly, Saskia Sassen (2014, 2010) introduced a new conceptual category of 
‘expulsions’ to delineate the contemporary processes of dispossession in the context of 
qualitative shift from Keynesian (Fordist regime of accumulation) to neoliberal (flexible regime 
of accumulation) development model. She argued that ‘developmental’ state under Fordist 
regime of accumulation was focused on the ‘inclusion’ of people as workers and consumers into 
the ambit of the formalized economy, whereas in the neoliberal period, development processes 
are predicated on the ‘expulsion’ of the people from their land/homes, livelihoods and the formal 
sector of the economy. In other words, capital is expanding and incorporating new places and 
sectors of the economy under its command while people are being ‘expulsed’ (Sassen 2010:24). 
It is in this context that the dispossessed groups in the contemporary global South are 
qualitatively distinct from the classical notion reserve army of labor because it is the not the 
rising organic composition of capital which is making them ‘surplus-population’ from the 
perspective of capital but rather it is incorporation of non-capitalist spaces into circuit of capital 
(see Harriss-White 2018).  Those who engage in petty-commodity production and other 
precarious forms of labor can be classified under Marx’s floating reserve army of labor48. 
Capital in the postcolonial capitalism is more interested in acquiring land (and other 
natural resources) rather than employing wage-labor. Li (2011) echoed this point “their 
[dispossessed] land is needed but their labor is not” (p. 286). In fact, dispossession is “merely a 
tactic for getting people out of the way” and getting access to their land (Kenney-Lazar 2012, 
1033). The key underlying factor behind dispossession and separation of people from their 
means of production and subsistence is that “they are in possession of land and other resources to 
 
48 Marx divided reserve army of labor into four types and he argued that reserve army of unemployed 
plays a functional role in keeping wages and bargaining power of working people low as a class.   
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which capital wants access” (Hall 2013, 1596). Saskia Sassen summarizes the contemporary 
nature of dispossession in the following words: 
One brutal way of putting it is to say that the natural resources of much of Africa, [Asia] 
and good parts of Latin America count more than the people on those lands count as 
consumers and as workers. I see this as part of this systemic deepening of advanced 
capitalist relations of production (Sassen 2010, 26). 
In the hindsight of contemporary processes of ‘dispossession without proletarianization’ in the 
global South, I offer a new reconceptualization of Marx’s (1867) original notion of primitive 
accumulation. At a theoretical level, primitive accumulation is a combination of the following 
two processes. One, a transition towards the ‘real subsumption of labor’ by capital. Enclosures 
and dispossession ensured the separation of small peasants/artisans from means of subsistence 
and facilitated a transition from petty-commodity production (peasant/artisan) to factory wage-
labor, i.e. a transition towards ‘real subsumption of labor’49 by capital. Two, a transition towards 
the ‘real subsumption of space’ by capital. Dispossession facilitated the control and command of 
capital on the erstwhile non-commodified land.  This is what I call a transition towards the ‘real 
subsumption of space’ by capital, i.e. the process of land-commodification. In the contemporary 
neoliberal period, the processes of dispossession are primarily centered on the subsumption of 
space by capital, i.e. commodification of erstwhile non-commodified land (see chapter one for a 
detailed theoretical presentation of this concept).  
The transition towards real subsumption of space create new opportunities for the 
appropriation of rents. Andreucci et al (2017) introduced the notion of ‘value-grabbing’ to make 
sense of the contemporary processes of dispossession: 
 
49 The real subsumption refers to the labor process in which relative surplus is produced and 
appropriated 
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The central dynamic at play is the instituting of property rights that are not used 
exclusively or even mainly to produce new commodities, but rather are mobilized to 
extract value through rent relations. To this end, we introduce the notion of value 
grabbing, a term that aims to render visible and politicize taken-for-granted distributional 
relations that have implications for socio-ecological struggles and inequalities (Andreucci 
et al 2017, 2). 
 
Andreucci et al (2017) are right in emphasizing the extraction of value from land, but they do not 
elaborate on an important intermediary step which facilitates the process of ‘value-grabbing’. 
The key point here is that the commodification of land does not necessarily imply a change from 
common/collective ownership to private ownership. A large share of privately owned/controlled 
land in the countryside in many developing countries is not ‘commodified’ yet and it can 
undergo real subsumption of land. Therefore, the transition towards real subsumption of land by 
capital, especially in rural areas, implies the production of new-spaces through change in the 
land-use. In particular, I argue that the production of new enclaved spaces via and change in 
land-use from farm to non-farm commercial real estate activities provide new opportunities for 
value-grabbing. I refer to the dual processes of dispossession and the production of new enclaved 
spaces (change in land-use from farm to commercial real estate) as ‘expulsionary’ 
development50. In fact, the driving factor behind the processes of dispossession without 
proletarianization is the prevailing regime of ‘expulsionary’ development in countries of the 
global South.  
The transformation of vast ‘rural’ areas through the expansion of …. land grabbing, and 
territorial enclosure; and the commodification of ‘wilderness’ spaces, including the 
atmosphere itself … serve the profit imperatives of a planetary formation of capitalist 
urbanization (Ruddick et al 2018, 389). 
 
50 The notion of expulsionary development can also explain the conundrum of ‘awkward classes’ 
(petty-commodity producers) posed by Harriss-White (2018) to Marxian theory. 
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At the intermediate level of analysis, it is important to analyze why capital decides to go 
to place ‘x’ to dispossess people as compared to place ‘y’? Based on the framework of 
expulsionary development, it is clear that capital would only go to those places which have a 
relatively high potential for land-commodification so that it can engage in value-grabbing. It is in 
this context, I argue that the processes of dispossession are directly linked to the relative 
spatiality of places. But the existing literature on theories of ABD has not fully incorporate the 
notion of spatiality in processes of dispossession. This chapter fills this void in the literature by 
reconstructing a socio-spatial conceptualization of the theory of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’.  
Based on the socio-spatial conceptualization of processes of dispossession, I elaborate 
here why Levien’s (2012, 2011) argument about the absence of ‘developed’ rural land markets as 
one of the defining characteristics of ABD needs to be problematized. I argue that it is the nature 
of the expulsionary development --- a development regime centered on the production of new 
enclaved spaces such as gated housing enclaves --- which pushes capital-state nexus to undertake 
dispossession --- rather than the absence of fully developed rural land markets. Expulsionary 
development is predicated on the acquisition of large tracts of contiguous land to build new 
enclaved spaces and that is why places with ‘developed’ land markets51 (e.g. urban centers in 
developing countries) are also witnessing dispossession at a large scale (see Khan and Karak 
2019). In other words, the prevailing regime of expulsionary development drives the processes of 
dispossession irrespective of whether land markets are developed or not.  Moreover, the spatial 
 
51 It is highly difficult, costly and cumbersome to acquire large tracts of contiguous land through 
voluntary market transactions. Dispossession increases the profit rate for the real estate 
developers/capitalists.   
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lens allows me to address the shortcomings in Harvey’s theory of ABD52, in particular, the lack 
of differentiation between ABD and expanded reproduction. I argue that ABD should be 
understood in terms of the commodification of previously non-commodified53 assets through 
economic and/or extra-economic power54. The commodification of land is connected with the 
socio-spatial restructuring of the place.  
3.3.1 Road Networks and Spatiality 
 
Socio-spatial differences between rural and urban, inner cities and suburbs, global north and 
global south, are well known. But at times these spatial differentiations seem so obvious that the 
space becomes trivial and it leads to the fallacy of externalizing spatiality from the political 
economic analyses without being cognizant of it (see Khan 2019; Motiram and Vakulabharanam 
2018, 2017). Harvey’s (2004) tripartite division of space (absolute, relative and relational) is 
helpful in understanding the dynamics of the socio-spatial dialectic.  According to Harvey, 
absolute space is static and fixed; it is a frame in which events take place. Absolute space is 
immovable, and it can be geometrically measured (Harvey 2004, 2). In the context of socio-
economic analysis, absolute space would be represented in terms of bounded territories such as 
administrative units, private property and urban grid (ibid). The notion of relative space is more 
dynamic vis-à-vis the absolute space. Relative space exists as a relationship between different 
objects. The conceptualization of relative space depends on the objects which are being 
relativized (Harvey 2004, 3). Contrary to the notion of absolute space which can be 
 
52 Whereas, the processes of expanded reproduction deal with already commodified assets 
53 It includes different types of property ownership: collective, common and private.  
54 Harvey (2005) identified the following four types of ABD: privatization and commodification 
of previously non-commodified assets, financialization, the management and manipulation of 
crises, and state redistributions of wealth from the poor to the rich (p. 160-165). 
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conceptualized independent of time, relative space has to be understood in temporal context: 
‘spatiotemporality’ (ibid). “The movement of people, goods, services and information takes 
place in a relative space because it takes money, time, energy, and the like to overcome the 
friction of distance” (Harvey 2004, 5). Relational space refers to the notion that space contains 
object in itself. That is, the relational space cannot be conceptualized without the processes that 
take place in the space (Harvey 2004, 4). Harvey (2004) eloquently captures aforementioned 
three conceptualizations of space by using an example of a house:  
I recognize it [house] as a physical and legal entity that situates it in absolute space. I also 
recognize its position in relative space given its location with respect to places of 
employment, recreation, services and the flows of people, electricity, water, and money 
that sustain it as a living habitat. But then I also understand its relationality to global 
property markets, changing interest rates, climatic change, the sense of what is or is not a 
historic building, and its significance as a place of personal and collective memories, 
sentimental attachments, and the like (p. 6).   
From a Marxian political economy framework, I argue that spatial understanding of the 
processes of dispossession is necessary because “social and spatial relationships are dialectically 
inter-reactive, inter-dependent; that social relations of production are both space-forming and 
space-contingent” (Soja 1980, 211). But how can we empirically capture the change in 
‘spatiality’? This is where I introduce road networks and their role in the processes of 
dispossession as they change space both in absolute and relative terms. In other words, I use the 
construction of a new road network a proxy for the change in the relative spatiality and this 
allows us to explore the impact of socio-spatial change on the processes of dispossession. 
 3.4 A case study of the Postcolonial Punjab, Pakistan 
 
As a budgetary item, the construction of new road networks is the largest outlay in Pakistan’s 
Public Sector Development Programs (PSDP).  Pakistan is also in the process of receiving huge 
sums of investment ($50 billion) via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), hoping to 
51 
positively transform the country’s socio-economic landscape through a corridor development 
(Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform 2017). This makes Pakistan an interesting case 
study to analyze processes of accumulation by dispossession in the context of changes in the 
relative spatiality of the places. In particular, this section delineates the modalities through which 
infrastructural intervention, construction of a new mega highway, leads to differential 
‘development’ outcomes ---dispossession and accumulation --- at the scale of a village economy 
in Sheikhupura55 district (Punjab) Pakistan. In an agrarian setting, one can reasonably presume 
that the new road will allow owner-cultivators--- farmers who own their own land--- improved 
access to distant markets, thus expanding the possibility set of their scale of production, and 
possibly liberating them from the dual bondage of the middle-man (the Arthi), who often acts as 
the creditor as well as the buyer of the output (see Jan 2019; Shami 2012a). But at the same time, 
the infrastructural intervention can also increase the price of the asset--- the land itself--- 
possibly incentivizing the move to an alternative use for the land.  
Therefore, to examine locally heterogeneous effects, and in particular how road networks 
effect the processes of dispossession, this chapter posits the construction of the M2 Islamabad to 
Lahore motorway, which runs through Sheikhupura-district, as a quasi-natural experiment (see 
Shami 2012a). In 1998 the construction of Motorway was completed which stretched across 367 
Kilometers from Lahore (capital of Punjab) to Islamabad (capital of Pakistan). It cuts through 
small towns and villages in Sheikhupura district. This allows us to use variation in terms of 
distance and connectivity from the motorway across villages in Sheikhupura as a random 
assignment at the level of the local economy (see Shami 2012a). So based on this exogenous 
 
55 Punjab has experienced a number of infrastructural interventions in canals, railways, and roads 
over the course of its colonial and post-colonial history (Azhar 2016; Javid 2011). 
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shock, villages can be divided into connected villages (they are connected to the motorway 
through a linked paved) and isolated villages. Furthermore, the villages in Sheikhupura can be 
divided into two categories based on land ownership: landlord villages (where there is only one 
large landowner) and peasant villages (there are multiple medium and large size landowners)56 
(see Chaudhary and Vyborny 2013; Shami 2012a).  This gives us a matrix of four possibilities: 
landlord versus peasant villages that are, in each case, isolated or connected. Based on this 
research design it can be inferred that contemporaneous differences in development outcomes, in 
particular, dispossession can be associated with changes in the relative spatiality of villages (see 
Shami 2012a).   
3.4.1 Household Survey 
 
A primary household survey was conducted by using a two-stage stratified random sampling 
method57.  In the first stage, villages were stratified across village type (landlord or peasant 
village) and spatiality58 (connected to motorway or isolated). Four connected villages (two 
landlord and two peasant villages) and four isolated villages (two landlord and two peasant 
villages) were randomly selected. At the second stage, households were selected through random 
stratification based on their biraderi/caste as it plays an important role in the context of rural 
Punjab (see Martin 2016; Javid 2012).  Households were asked questions59 related to their 
demographic background, socio-economic profile, particularly land ownership, change in land-
use, and dispossession/eviction. The total sample size is 384 households. 
 
56 This does not mean that peasant villages are egalitarian, instead, the only difference between 
peasant and isolated villages is presence of more than one large landowner.  
57 International Growth Center provided the research grant for the collection of primary data.  
58 Connected villages are those which are nearby the motorway and connected to motorway 
through metaled link roads.  
59 Data on provision of public goods and political networks was also collected.  
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1. Avg. size of the HH 8.5 8.5 9 8 
2. HHs with Dominant castes/biraderis 31% 33% 32% 30% 
3. HHs with historically disadvantaged 
castes/biraderis 
69% 67% 68% 70% 
4. HHs under debt obligation from an 
informal institution such as local 
influential/local moneylender 
28% 29% 23% 25% 
5. HHs who own farm/agricultural land 33% 42% 35% 43% 
Outcome  
6. HHs dispossessed/evicted from 
farmland for the non-farm commercial 
use of the land since 1998 
33% 6% 25% 4% 
7. Among dispossessed how many were 
sharecroppers? 
81% 86% 79% 80% 
8. Among dispossessed how many lost 
their own land due to debt-burden? 
17% 14% 16% 20% 
9. Gated housing enclave built since 
1998? 
Yes No Yes No 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
 
From Table 3.1 we can see that villages share similar dynamics in terms of average size of the 
household, distribution of dominant and historically disadvantaged castes/biraderis, and the 
number of indebted households. Interestingly, the number of households who own land is lower 
in the connected villages (thirty-three percent in landlord villages and thirty five percent in 
peasant villages) vis-à-vis isolated villages (forty two percent in landlord and forty three percent 
in peasant villages, respectively). But the most revealing result is the following: a significantly 
higher number of households located in connected villages (thirty-three percent and twenty-two 
percent in landlord and peasant villages, respectively) vis-à-vis isolated villages (six percent and 
four percent in landlord and peasant villages, respectively) have experienced 
dispossession/eviction since the construction of the M2 motorway. On average 
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dispossession/evictions are twenty-nine percent in connected villages and five percent in isolated 
villages, i.e. twenty-four percent higher incidence of dispossession/eviction rates in connected 
villages.  
Figure 3.1. Dispossession/Evictions from Farmland 
 
 
The processes of dispossession can be further divided into two types. One, sharecroppers are 
dispossessed and separated from their means of production and subsistence. Around eighty 
percent of households which have experienced dispossession in connected villages (81 percent in 
landlord villages and 79 percent in peasant villages) were sharecroppers. Across rural Punjab, 
sharecropping contracts are commonly used by landholders and it is a major source of livelihood 
for the lower orders of the society. Two, small peasants have experienced dispossession. In 
connected villages, around twenty percent dispossessed households were small peasants. The 
role of informal institutional mechanisms is critical in the processes of dispossession and 
informality is being used to confer advantages and disadvantages based on the class positions. 






















combination of written and verbal agreements to further improve their bargaining power in 
transactions with the lower orders of society (sharecroppers and small peasants). The 
dispossessed sharecroppers had verbal (rather than written) agreements with the landholders. 
Given the stark power asymmetry between the large landholders and sharecroppers, the lack of 
written agreement further declines the bargaining power of sharecroppers as they can be evicted 
anytime from the land. It played a key role in the evictions/dispossession of sharecroppers.  
Similarly, in the case of small peasants, large landowners and local money lenders used 
informal institutions in their own favor to dispossess them. Small peasants borrowed money from 
informal credit sources such as local moneylenders and local influential (large landholder). 
Interestingly, both money lenders and large landholders did written agreements and used land as 
a collateral from small peasants. Land is confiscated from small landholders on the pretext that 
they have defaulted on their loans because they are late on loan payment schedule. In other 
words, debt has been used as an instrument to dispossess/evict people from their land/livelihood. 
Despite the fact that debt burden on small peasants was similar in both connected and isolated 
villages, at least, sixteen percent households in the connected villages (seventeen percent in 
landlord villages and sixteen percent in peasant villages) have lost their land due to debt. But 
creditors (local money lenders and local influential) are not interested in confiscating land of 
small landholders in isolated villages instead they urge them to keep making payments on their 
loans even if they are behind the schedule. This divergence between the connected and isolated 
villages is linked to the regime of expulsionary development. It is the growth of new gated 
housing enclaves in connected villages which are driving the processes of dispossession. The rise 
of gated housing enclaves started in 2000s in Sheikhupura, i.e. after the construction of the 
motorway. New gated housing enclaves have been built in connected villages as they provide a 
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suitable site from the perspective of the real estate developers. Gated housing enclaves have 
experienced a seven hundred percent increase since 1998. GIS data shows that built-up area has 
increased by twenty-four percent and agricultural area has declined by twenty-nine percent since 
the year 2000 (Raza et al 2016; see figure B.2 in appendix).  




The growth of gated housing enclaves explains the fact that land from small peasants is 
confiscated when it was profitable for the large landholders and money lender to do so, in 
particular, when they can sell it to the real estate developers. It is in this context, the informal 
credit markets are used to dispossess small landholders from their lands.  Similarly, 
sharecroppers were evicted in the connected villages because it became profitable for the 
landholders to make their land available for the real estate commercial projects rather than 
















Growth in Gated Housing Enclaves
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villages in terms of the magnitude of land transactions since the construction of the motorway. 
As it can be seen in figure 3.3 below, both types of villages had similar level of land transactions 
prior to 1998 but today the connected villages have thirty-two percent higher volume of land 
transactions vis-à-vis isolated villages. This is a manifestation of the commodification and 
commercialization of the farmland, i.e. a transition towards real subsumption of land by capital. 
It is important to point out that the processes of dispossession do not necessarily imply 
change in the landownership (e.g. common to private) because the change in land-use from farm 
to non-farm can also lead to dispossession, as it happened in the case of sharecroppers. When the 
farmland is transformed into gated housing enclaves, land prices increase and this creates new 
rents for the appropriation, i.e. value-grabbing. There is a nexus of real estate developers, local 
influential (large landholders) and state bureaucrats who accrue large rents from the new gated 
housing enclaves. In short, the selective infrastructural policies and the production of new 
enclaved spaces (i.e. change in land-use from farm to non-farm) facilitate the processes of value-
grabbing60. It is important to note that gated housing enclaves require acquisition of large tracts 
of ‘contiguous’ land so that they can build fences and boundary walls around it. Even in the 
presence of fully developed land markets, it is extremely difficult to acquire land at such a large 
scale from every small and medium size landowner. In Karachi and Islamabad, land markets are 
fully developed, yet dispossession is used to acquire land by real estate developers (see Anwar 
2018; Khan and Karak 2019). Therefore, I argue that significance of land markets (whether they 
are fully developed or not) as claimed by Levien (2012, 2011) is limited in the processes of 
dispossession. Instead, it is the prevailing regime of expulsionary development, i.e. the 
 
60 This chapter has expanded on Andreucci et al (2017) which missed out a significant 
intermediary step, change in the land use, to materialize the appropriation of rents.   
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production of new enclaved spaces for value-grabbing, which is the key underlying factor behind 
the dispossession of marginalized groups from their land and livelihoods. 
 3.5 Conclusion 
 
Harvey’s (2003) theory of accumulation by dispossession (ABD) has been the most influential 
framework to delineate the modalities of contemporary processes of dispossession. But in recent 
literature, it has been argued that Harvey’s (2003) theory of ABD is not apt to delineate the 
particularities of the processes of dispossession in the global South because it does not 
differentiate between the role of economic and extra-economic (coercive) processes. As a 
redressal, Michael Levien (2018, 2011) has offered a reconstructed version of the theory of ABD 
by emphasizing the role of ‘extra-economic coercion’ and the absence of fully ‘developed’ rural 
land markets as defining characteristics of the processes of dispossession in the global South. 
This chapter has made an intervention in this debate by drawing from a case study of the 
postcolonial Punjab, Pakistan. In response to Levien (2018) this chapter has argued that the 
contemporary processes of dispossession should not be understood only in terms of extra-
economic coercion because they are also mediated by the complex interplay between ‘economic’ 
as well as extra-economic (coercion) factors. In particular, this chapter has demonstrated that 
Levien (2018) has restricted the role of the state in ABD to expropriation via the declaration of 
some land as eminent domain. Whereas, in reality, the state plays a much more dynamic role in 
the processes of dispossession because it actively engineers potential rents and facilitates 
speculation through its selective infrastructural policy that includes some places and excludes 
others. The roads networks are particularly important as connectivity increase prices of land, and 
hence the potential rents and speculative gains that can be derived through the commercialization 
and commodification of the land. This manifests through the production of ‘new enclaved 
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spaces’ on erstwhile farmland which requires the change in land-use from farm to commercial 
real-estate. 
The chapter has argued that the processes of dispossession have been mediated by 
differences in the relative spatiality of the places. That is, villages which are connected to the 
motorway have witnessed rapid growth in gated housing enclaves and dispossession (evictions 
from the land) vis-à-vis the isolated villages, despite having similar socio-economic 
demographics. Based on this, the chapter has problematized Levien’s (2018) argument about the 
absence of ‘developed’ rural land markets as the underlying cause of dispossession. Instead, the 
chapter has emphasized a role of the prevailing regime of neoliberal development which is 
centered on the socio-spatial restructuring of the places for the purpose of value-grabbing 






4. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UNEVEN STATE-SPATIALITY: CONFLICT, 




The role of the state is integral in mediating the processes of capitalist development. Marxian 
theories conceptualize the state in two distinct ways. On the one hand, the state is seen as an 
instrument in the hands of capitalist class to further its economic interests (Miliband 1977; Lenin 
1977; Mollenkopf 1975). The agency of ideology, politics and culture is muted in this approach. 
In contrast, the second approach centralizes the role of class struggle, ideology and politics in 
mediating the overall dynamics of the state (see Gallas 2017; Das 1996; Ollman 1982; Poulantzas 
1976). Building on this latter approach, Resnick and Wolff (1987) offered one of the most dynamic 
conceptualizations of the state, a site of contestation among different socio-economic, political, 
ideological and cultural actors. Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) theory of the state is a truly open-
ended conceptual framework because they analyze the role of the state in the context of its 
dialectical relationship with the society, that is, societal contradictions and conflicts mediate the 
nature and form of state and the state also reacts back upon the society. The electoral process62 is 
one of the mediums through which the conflict manifests and mitigates itself in democratic 
countries.  
 
61 This chapter has benefited a lot from the discussions I had with Shahram Azhar and Aasim 
Sajjad Akhtar. Moreover, I received insightful feedback from Prof. Akber S. Zaidi and Prof. 
Mathew McCartney on an earlier draft. 
62 The contestation among different socio-economic actors are mitigated through elections to 
form the parliament and the elected government (executive branch). 
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In many postcolonial ‘formal’ democracies such as Pakistan, elections are held regularly 
but yet the military as an institution, a multi-class organization, dominates other state actors 
(institutions) including the parliament and the elected civilian government. The internal conflict 
among the state entities, i.e. the contestation between unelected military and the elected civilian 
government is one of the pressing contradictions in many postcolonial states63. By drawing from 
Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) dialectical understanding of the state-society relationship, this chapter 
explores the following question: how does the internal contestation/conflict in the state, in 
particular, civil-military conflict, mediate the underlying dynamics of the postcolonial state and its 
relationship with the society?  
It is important to point out that a theorization of the state presupposes the demarcation 
between internal and external actors/forces to the state. ‘Internal’ forces of the state are the 
institutions (e.g. legislative branch, judiciary and the executive) and the personnel which constitute 
the state-apparatus and rest of the society can be envisaged as ‘external’ to the state-apparatus. 
Although, the strength of Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) theory of the state is its emphasis on the 
conflict but it has been primarily focused on the contestation between ‘external’ actors (different 
classes/political parties/trade-unions etc.). The contestation between actors internal to the state 
(military, civilian administration, judiciary etc.) remains muted and underexplored in their 
analyses. The chapter fills this void in the literature by drawing from the case study of the 
postcolonial state of Pakistan.  
It is argued here that the conflict within the state apparatus --- the unelected military and 
the elected civilian institutions (parliament and executive) --- plays an important role in mediating 
 
63 Parliament and elected government are not only mediated by the dynamics of the class struggle 
but also by the hegemonic institution, i.e. military.  
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political economic dynamics of the state and society. To delineate the state-society interaction, the 
chapter builds on Henri Lefebvre’s (1970) work on the state-spatiality --- an ensemble of physical 
state-space (public infrastructure such as roads, canals, airports etc.), social state-space (civil-
military bureaucracies and administrative apparatus) and mental state space, (ideological 
discourse) --- and illustrates that the internal contestation in the postcolonial state of Pakistan has 
resulted into uneven development of state-spatiality. That is, the state-spaces are highly uneven 
and variegated across provincial (Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh and KP) lines in Pakistan. In 
particular, the physical state-spaces are more developed in Punjab as compared to other provinces, 
especially Balochistan. Similarly, Punjab has a disproportionately higher representation and 
Balochistan is under-represented in the civil-military bureaucracies (social state-space). Punjab-
oriented ideological discourse (mental state-space) is branded as the ‘national discourse’, and 
indigenous Baloch, Pashtun and Sindhi culture, traditions and political imaginaries are 
marginalized from the national discourse. The chapter argues that the underlying factor behind the 
development of uneven state-spatiality in Pakistan is the civil-military contradiction, i.e.  to ensure 
its dominance over the state-society, the military has engineered a Punjab-centric hegemonic order 
in which people from the peripheries (Balochistan, rural Sindh and KPK) of the country have been 
marginalized/‘otherized’ from both the state and society64.  
Given the pronounced nature of the civil-military conflict in the state, critical 
institutionalist scholars (see Zaidi 2019, 2014; Shah 2014) have argued that the Marxian approach 
has become redundant because institutions rather than the class processes are integral in 
delineating the underlying dynamics of the postcolonial state in Pakistan. This chapter intervenes 
 
64 Postcoloniality in Pakistan can be understood in terms of uneven development of state and 
society.  While, the latter has been delineated in length in the development literature the former 
has been largely overlooked. 
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in this debate by arguing that the military’s hegemonic rule cannot be explained solely via the 
institutional lens. Marxian surplus approach remains relevant to understand the economic interests 
of Pakistani military as it directly command and control one of the largest commercial enterprises 
in the country. Therefore, the chapter argues that class processes and institutions are enmeshed 
and should be seen as a dialectical unity in the postcolonial state-society of Pakistan.  
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner. Section two provides a critical 
analysis of Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) theory of the state and contextualizes it in the light of 
recent political economic literature on the postcolonial state. Section three focuses on the case 
study of Pakistan, in particular, it explains the underlying dynamics of the internal conflict in the 
postcolonial state of Pakistan. In section four, Henri Lefebvre’s (1970) notion of the state-spatiality 
is introduced to explain the modalities through which internal conflict in the postcolonial state 
mediates and regulates the relationship between the state and society in Pakistan.  Conclusion of 
the paper is provided in the fifth section.  
 4.2 Dialectical Understanding of the State and Society  
 
The orthodox Marxian theories of the state have been primarily criticized as being overly 
‘economistic’ and as a result, they tend to discount the active role of culture, ideology and 
institutional heterogeneity in mediating the dynamics of the ‘capitalist state’ (see Emadian 2019; 
Roy 2015; Jessop 1990; Skocpol 1985; Mann 1984). I find merit in these arguments by drawing 
from Marx’s (1967) original approach which is open-ended and it is best spelled out in his three 
volumes of Capital.  Marx (1967) noted that the class processes cannot prevent the ‘‘same 
economic basis due to innumerable different empirical circumstances, natural environment, 
racial relations, external historical influences, etc. from showing infinite variations which can be 
ascertained only by analysis of the empirically given circumstances’’ (Marx 1967, 3, 791-792). 
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Moreover, Marx acknowledged that substantive institutional heterogeneity in the form and 
characteristics of the state can exist in different states under capitalism. For example, he posited 
that a new socio-economic order can be built in countries like America, England, and Holland 
through a peaceful political struggle but this might not be necessarily true for other countries 
(Marx 1964, 19-21). Similarly, Engels lauded the electoral achievements of social democratic 
parties in Europe for advancing the class struggle (see Manley 2006, 165-166). In other words, 
Marx and Engels incorporated the role of political process, ideology and culture in mediating the 
underlying characteristics of the state. I find Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) theory of the state as 
the pertinent point of departure because it encapsulates Marx’s open-ended approach and 
incorporates the role of historical, political, ideological, economic and cultural particularities in 
mediating the overall dynamics of the state.  
In the Resnick and Wolff (1987) framework, the state is a “site in society…it is a location 
or grouping of specific relationships that each comprise a particular subset of social and natural 
processes. It is a place in society where various sorts of processes are performed and which 
define it qua social site” (p. 231).  They do not make an apriori generalization about the role of 
the state in a ‘given’ situation but rather encourage the investigation of the particularities of the 
economic, political, ideological and cultural factors in overdetermining the dynamics of the state 
and society. The state is as an active participant in both the class and non-class processes, and 
the former are conceptualized as dynamic processes rather than static-structures in their 
framework. The class processes are understood in terms of how production, appropriation and 
distribution of surplus product is organized in the society. In other words, 'class’ can only be 
understood via its relationship with the production, appropriation and distribution of the 
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‘surplus’.65 Resnick and Wolff (1987) divide class processes into two sub-categories: 
fundamental class processes and subsumed class processes. Fundamental class processes are the 
ones which involve production and distribution of surplus product and the subsumed class 
processes are the ones through which surplus product is distributed and received by different 
socio-economic agents. A process which does not involve production, appropriation and 
distribution of surplus is regarded as a ‘non-class’ process66. Based on this conceptual 
framework, they argued that “states in different capitalist societies will differ according to which 
social processes are or are not performed by them” (Resnick and Wolff 1987, 233). For example, 
the state can directly engage in the class processes through state-owned enterprises and performs 
the role of a ‘capitalist’ by appropriating the surplus value from direct producers67. Similarly, the 
state can also get subsumed class payments through taxation on the profits accrued by privately 
owned enterprises. Moreover, the state can generate its revenue from non-class payments 
through taxation on salaried groups or sales tax, tariffs, etc. The state participates in different 
non-class processes such as building dams, public infrastructure and so forth.   
 
65 It is important to point out that their unit of analysis is at a micro level (enterprise/household). 
66 In sharp contrast to orthodox Marxian framework Resnick and Wolff (1987) acknowledge that 
totality of human society is a mixture of both class and non-class processes. 
67 The caveat here is that Resnick and Wolff (1987) framework does not differentiate between 
processes of production that take place at private enterprises from those that take place at the 
state enterprises. The state enterprise might enter a production process with a totally different set 
of objectives vis-à-vis a private enterprise. And this has huge political economic implications for 
the society. For example, the production of health services under the state-run National Health 
Services in the United Kingdom cannot be equated with the production of private health services 
in the United States. Moreover, the state can change the rules and regulations of political and 
economic processes as it enjoys total monopoly over means of violence. Thus, if state engages in 
production processes it would have an extra advantage vis-à-vis any private enterprise and these 
are the significant aspects of the living reality of the postcolonial societies which Resnick and 
Wolff (1987) framework might not capture.  
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The manner and extent to which the state engages in each process depends on the balance 
of power between different classes/groups in a society. For example, if organized labor and 
progressive political movements are strong then the state is more likely to allocate large sums of 
funds for programs such as unemployment benefits, social security, etc. On the other hand, if 
those associated with defence industry are influential and powerful then the state is much more 
likely to undertake high levels of defence expenditures. In Resnick and Wolff’s framework, the 
state is always pushed and pulled in different directions. In other words, the ‘contestation’ and 
‘conflict’ in society among classes/groups plays a central role in mediating the dynamics of the 
state.  
The nature and form of the conflict would vary depending on the concrete historical, 
political, culture and institutional factors. In the case of the postcolonial India, Kalyan Sanyal 
(2007) explained the prevailing conflict in state-society through the dialectic of ‘primitive 
accumulation and governmentality’.  That is, on the one hand, the postcolonial state facilitates 
dispossession and marginalization of the vulnerable segments of the society. But at the same 
time, the state also mitigates some of the negative impacts of capitalist development through 
cash transfers, guaranteed employment schemes and by allowing ‘illegal’ squatter settlements 
and petty commodity production (Sanyal 2007). Building on Sanyal, Chatterjee (2008) pointed 
out that there is not a level playing field to bargain and contest over the state resources in the 
postcolonial India. He argued that the postcolonial state-society interactions are demarcated 
between the civil society and the political society. The privileged segments of the Indian society 
engage with the state through the formally coded rules and regulations in the realm of civil 
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society; whereas, the subalterns are restricted to engage with the state through the informal68 
networks of patronage and clientelism. Roy (2009) formulated the notion of ‘informal state’ to 
signify the role of ‘discretion’ in the hands of state-officials to confer advantages and 
disadvantages69. In short, the role of the state cannot be fully understood without contextualizing 
the nature of the contestation and conflict between different socio-economic-state actors.  
Moreover, building a theory of the state presupposes the conceptual demarcation between 
actors which are ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the state. Internal actors include institutions and the 
personnel who constitute the state-apparatus, while, rest of the society can be envisaged as 
‘external’ to the state-apparatus. In Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) theory of the state and other 
influential works discussed above, the emphasis is on the contestation between actors ‘external’ 
(classes/groups) to the state-apparatus to explain the dynamics of the state. But does conflict not 
take place among actors internal to the state?  
Miliband (1983) noted that the internal conflict70 within the state can be of two types. One, 
the pursuit of self-interest by state-officials on the expense of others can generate conflict and 
second, the differences within state personnel and/or institutions on the conception of ‘national 
interest’. In many postcolonial countries, we see a recurrence of the conflict in the state apparatus, 
that is, the military’s disregard of constitutionally mandated supremacy of the parliament and 
 
68 Roy (2009) and Banks, Lombard and Mitlin (2020) have argued that informality is not an 
‘exception’ but a norm in the global South. 
69 Similarly, Akhtar (2018) has argued that ‘access to state’ official and resources plays a central 
in accumulating capital in the postcolonial Pakistan. In short, the recent literature has highlighted 
the centrality of contestation and conflict between different socio-economic and state actors in 
understanding the role of the state 
70 The internal conflict within the state can be of both class and non-class nature. Erik Olin 
Wright (1978) argued that class struggle within the state-apparatus can be on the issues of higher 
wages and unionization of state-workers. 
68 
civilian rule to further its own economic and institutional interests. From this vantage point, I build 
on Resnick and Wolff’s work by acknowledging and incorporating the role of state’s internal 
contradictions in mediating the form and character of the state.  
 
Figure 4.1. State-Society Dialectic 
 
4.3 Reconceptualizing the Postcolonial State: A case study of Pakistan 
 
Postcolonial countries are highly diverse and I do not intend to generalize the postcolonial state as 
a homogenous proto-type, therefore, I focus on the particularities of a postcolonial state: 
Pakistan71. But from every particularity, some generalities can be drawn, and in this case it is the 
‘internal conflict’ within the state-apparatus. Pakistan is an interesting case study to analyze the 
internal conflict in the postcolonial state because the contestation between elected institutions of 
the state and military has been a recurring theme throughout the seventy odd year history of the 
country (Akhtar 2018). Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the military dictators have violated, 
suspended and abrogated the constitution of the country three times. Military has directly ruled 
Pakistan for more than thirty years. Hamza Alavi, one of the most eminent critical scholar of the 
postcolonial state of Pakistan, forwarded the notion of an “overdeveloped” state to explain the 
dominant and hegemonic role of the Pakistani military (Alavi 1972). By overdeveloped state he 
 
71 Pakistan is analyzed in the context of the dialectical relationship between the postcolonial state 
and society, in particular, the internal conflict in the state and its manifestation on the society. 
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meant that the civil-military bureaucracies are highly trained and advanced as compared to the rest 
of the society. According to Alavi, the overdeveloped state and the underdeveloped society is a 
legacy of British colonialism because the colonial state-apparatus was the major instrument to 
control, discipline and extract surplus out of Indian sub-continent. British invested heavily in the 
training and development of the colonial state apparatus because it was through the colonial state 
apparatus they “exercise[d] dominion over all the indigenous social classes in the colony” (Alavi 
1972, 61). On the other hand, British subjugated the civil society and political parties and it is in 
this context he argued that the postcolonial state developed disproportionately as compared to 
civil/political society. The overdeveloped state has continue to reproduce in the postcolonial period 
because the military as an institution “directly appropriate[s] a very large part of the economic 
surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting 
development” (Alavi 1972, 62).  
Jalal (1990) has problematized Alavi’s analysis by arguing that the postcolonial India also 
inherited the same British colonial legacy but yet it was able to develop a constitutional democracy 
and a civilian supremacy. Jalal’s critique on Alavi’s framework is valid but Tudor (2013) has 
pointed out some important historical factors which illustrate that the colonial rule effected 
Pakistan differently as compared to the postcolonial India. For example, majority of the area 
(provinces) which constituted Pakistan did not have a popular grassroots movement for the 
creation of a separate country called Pakistan (Tudor 2013). As a result, All India Muslim League, 
the founding political party of Pakistan, did not have substantive political presence and networks 
in places which comprised Pakistan. In comparison, All India National Congress, the party of the 
founding fathers of independent India, enjoyed organic support from the grassroots and was a 
robust political institution as compared to the Muslim League (ibid). Moreover, the mass migration 
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at the time of independence had a more dramatic socio-economic, spatial and political impact on 
Pakistan as compared to India due to former’s relatively small size as compared to the latter (ibid). 
Therefore, it was much easier for the civil-military bureaucracies to side step civilian politicians 
in Pakistan as compared to India.  
Although, military hegemony is directly tied to the colonial rule but the point that I would 
like to highlight here is that it remains contested from the beginning.  For example, the following 
statement from Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan (a civilian politician) 
clearly shows the inherent civil-military conflict in the newly formed state of Pakistan: 
Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people. You do not make national 
policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these 
tasks with which you are entrusted (Jinnah 1948, 224-225). 
Martial laws have faced strong resistance in Pakistan and through political struggle military 
dictators have bene ousted. Similarly, under elected civilian regimes, there has been a recurring 
conflict between the elected government and the military. Whenever the elected government 
refuses to take the dictation from the top brass of the military, the latter retaliates by destabilizing 
or overthrowing the former (Shah 2014). Retired military generals have publically admitted 
without any remorse that they have willingly undermined and sabotaged various elected civilian 
governments in the ‘national interest’ of the country (ibid). Similarly, many former Prime 
Ministers have publically expressed that the top brass of military have sabotaged and undermined 
their elected governments (Nadeem 2018).  
Table 4.1 shows that scholars have characterized the postcolonial state of Pakistan with 
multiple names but one underlying theme that connects these works is the hegemonic status of the 
military over the state and society. 
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Table 4.1. State-Typology and the postcolonial state of Pakistan 
State-Typology Author 
Overdeveloped state Hamza Alavi (1972) 
State of Martial Rule Ayesha Jalal (1991) 
Military Incorporated Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) 
State as a Landlord Aasim Sajjad Akhtar (2006) 
Autocratic State Maya Tudor (2013) 
Praetorian Democracy Chaitram Singh and Michael 
Bailey (2013) 
Garrison State Ishtiaq Ahmad (2013) 
 
In the recent past, the most notorious example is when military openly defied the elected civilian 
government on the issue of Kerry-Luger Act (KLA) in 2009-2010. The elected civilian 
government of Pakistan Peoples Party (its stronghold in Sindh province) signed KLA with the 
United States. KLA prioritized civilian aid and ties between two countries and demanded a more 
thorough accountability of the military aid to Pakistan. Among other things KLA mandated that in 
order to get US aid, Pakistan must ensure “civilian government control over the military, including 
oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for 
senior military leaders (Soherwordi 2011, 67). The military-establishment retaliated against KLA 
and it threatened the elected civilian government with a coup. This prompted the elected Prime 
Minister of Pakistan at the time Mr. Yusuf Raza Gillani to state that ‘there can be no state within 
a state” (Pakistan Today 2011). At the more abstract level, the civil-military conflict in Pakistan is 
about the distribution and concentration of power both at the level of state and society. I find 
Mushtaq Khan’s (2010) typology to characterize the state very useful in the context of 
understanding Pakistan (see table 4.e). According to Khan’s (2010) typology, the state of Pakistan 
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should be characterized by a ‘vulnerable authoritarian coalition’ where military is dominant but it 
faces strong resistance from other sections of the state and society.  
Table: 4.2. Mushtaq Khan’s Framework of Political Settlement 
 
Source: Mushtaq Khan (2010: 65) 
Based on the above discussion, I argue that the postcolonial state of Pakistan is a site of 
contestation from both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’. In other words, it is a dialectic of internal and 
external contradictions which mediates the form and character of the postcolonial state of 
Pakistan. The ‘internal’ fissure between the state institutions --- military and the elected 
government --- implies that the postcolonial state should not be seen as a ‘unitary’ or homogenous 
entity. Antonio Gramsci was the first Marxian theorist to highlight the fractured and differentiated 
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nature of the state. Gramsci wrote that “however much the ruling class may affirm to the contrary, 
the state, as such, does not have a unitary, coherent and homogenous conception” (Gramsci 1971, 
342). Therefore, it is imperative to go beyond the notion of undifferentiated and homogenous 
conceptualization of the state, and see it as internally fractured and variegated.   
Interplay of Institution and Class 
Given the significance of the contestation between military and elected governments in Pakistan, 
Zaidi (2014) has argued that institutional lens is relevant while class analysis has become 
redundant for analyzing the underlying dynamics of the postcolonial state of Pakistan. He noted, 
“[t]he analysis in Pakistan suggests that institutions rather than class determine the nature of the 
state. The media, judiciary, and parliament are all multi-class institutions, as is the military” (Zaidi, 
2014: 51). While I acknowledge the significance of institutions, but I argue that class remains 
relevant for the study of the postcolonial state of Pakistan. The conflict between the military and 
elected governments in Pakistan can be understood in the context of both class and institutional 
interests of the military. I illustrate that the class and institutional interests of the military are 
enmeshed and therefore, we should analyze class and institutions in a dialectical relationship. In 
other terms, neither institutions nor class processes on their own can fully capture the political 
economic complexities of the post-colonial state.   
Siddiqa (2007) used the term ‘Milbus’ to explain the military’s economic might in 
Pakistan. Milbus is the “military capital that is used for the personal benefit of the military 
fraternity, especially the officer cadre, but is neither recorded nor part of the defence budget” 
(Siddiqa 2007, 1). Siddiqa (2007) argued that Milbus allows military to exercise financial 
autonomy which is essential for the military’s hegemony over the state and society. Military’s 
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financial empire is substantially larger than the allocated defence expenditures that military gets 
as an institution (Siddiqa 2007, 2). 
The case study of Army Welfare Trust (AWT) illustrates the dynamic interplay between 
institutional and class interests of the top brass of the military72. AWT is a conglomerate73 of 
commercial enterprises controlled and managed by the military of Pakistan. AWT has diversified 
portfolio ranging from banking, real estate sector, cement, fertilizers, cereal, shoes, energy, 
wedding halls, CNG and security services (see Table 1). Each company engages in the processes 
of capital accumulation but what makes the conglomerate of AWT unique and interesting case 
study is the following fact. Usually, the control over an enterprise is linked with the stock 
ownership but in the case of AWT critical decisions about the production, appropriation and 
distribution of surplus are made by a supra body called the committee of administration (COA). 
Interestingly, the chief of army staff (the highest rank army officer in Pakistan) is the chairman of 
the COA. The adjutant general is the vice chairman, and the quarter master general, the chief of 
general staff and the chief of logistic staff are members of COA. In other words, top brass of the 
military constitute the COA. Similarly, the ‘board of directors’ (BOD) is also comprised of serving 
and retired generals of the army. The adjutant general serves as the chairman of the BOD (Azhar 
2016a, 10). This institutional setting implies that in order to make decision about surplus 
appropriation, one has to be a general in the military.  
 
72 The role of military in economic processes is seen in two distinct ways in the existing 
literature. On the one hand, there are those who see the role of military in alliance with landed 
elite and semi-feudalism (see Khan 2005; Dewey 1991). On the other hand, military is seen as an 
institution which is solely interested in maximizing its profits (see Aziz 2008; Siddiqa 2007). 
This paper finds both approaches reductionists and acknowledges that military as an institution is 
pushed and pulled in different directions based on its ideological, institutional, economic and 
political interests (see Khan 2016; Shah 2014). 
73 It is estimated that its net worth is over ten billion US dollars (Wilson 2008). On AWT website, 
it advertises that it’s worth is above Rs. 40 billion.  
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In other words, the Chief of Army Staff is also a ‘capitalist’ because he makes the decision 
about production, distribution and appropriation of the surplus (Khan 2019). However, he secures 
this ‘class’ role based on his ‘institutional’ title and hegemony of the military. Therefore, the 
successful reproduction of the hegemonic rule of the military is tied to both class and institutional 
interests of military’s top brass and this becomes analytically visible only through the deployment 
of Resnick and Wolff (1987) class theory of the state. 
There is also a possibility of inherent tension between the individual interests of the 
members of the COA and the institutional interests of AWT. This tension can arise due to the fact 
that a place in the COA is not tied to the ‘ownership’ of shares in the companies but it is linked 
with the rank and service in the military. Therefore, it could be argued that COA is primarily 
interested in maximizing its salaries/bonuses rather than traditional capitalist accumulation by 
reinvesting because as soon as a serving general retires, he/she is replaced by a new serving officer.  
Table 4.3. Conglomerate of Army Welfare Trust 
Conglomerate of AWT74 
Company Name Sector Firm type 
Askari General Insurance Co 
Ltd 
Insurance company Public Listed  
MAL Pakistan Ltd Petroleum/Oil Public Unlisted 
AWT Investments Ltd Non-banking finance Public Unlisted 
Askari Securities Ltd Corporate brokerage house Public Unlisted 
Askari Aviation Services Aviation  Private Limited 
 
74This is not an exhaustive list, AWT website claims it has 21 commercial enterprises but it only 
provides names and details of 16 companies which are listed in table 3.1. Source: 
http://www.awt.com.pk/home#, retrieved on July 21, 2020.  
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Askari Guards (Pvt) Limited Private security services Private Limited 
Askari Enterprises Pvt Ltd Weapon supplier, rice, coal 
and commodity trading 
Private Limited 
Fauji Security Services Pvt Ltd Private security services Private Limited 
Askari Development Holdings 
Pvt Ltd 
Infrastructure developer Private Limited 
Askari Real Estate Ltd Real estate developer  Not-specified 
Blue Lagoon and Army 
Welfare Mess 
Hotel and entertainment  Not-specified 
Askari Farms and Seeds Agricultural farms Not-specified 
Askari Fuels CNG supplier (natural gas 
fuel for vehicle) 
Not-specified 
Army Welfare Sugar Mills Sugar manufacturing  Not-specified 
Askari Shoe Project Shoes manufacturing  Not-specified 
Askari Woolen Mills Garments manufacturing  Not-specified 
 
4.4 Uneven State-Spaces in Postcolonial Pakistan 
 
The internal conflict in the state effects societal outcomes. I find Lefebvre’s (1970) notion of the 
state-spatiality as a powerful tool to delineate the dynamic interaction between the state and 
society. Lefebvre (1970) conceptualized the state-society interactions as an assemblage of the 
following three: physical state-space, social state-space and mental state-space. Physical state-
space refers to infrastructure, such as, networks of roads, rails, canals, airports etc. which facilitates 
the flow of people, capital and ideas across the given territory of the state. Social state-space refers 
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to different institutions of the state, i.e. administrative-bureaucratic organs of the state. For 
example, police, military and civil bureaucracies. Mental state-space captures different tools and 
instruments, such as education and culture, through which the state reproduces its ideological 
hegemony. The state must produce and reproduce space in ways which are synchronized with the 
state’s functionality (Lefebvre 2009).  
The geography of state spatiality must be viewed as a presupposition, an arena and an 
outcome of continually changing social relations. It is not a thing, a container or a platform, 
but a socially produced, conflictual and dynamically evolving matrix of socio-spatial 
interaction. The spaces of state power are not simply ‘filled,’ as if they were pre-given 
territorial containers. Instead, state spatiality is actively produced and transformed 
through socio-political struggles in diverse institutional sites and at a range of 
geographical scales. The traditional Westphalian image of states as being located within 
static, self-contained territorial arenas must thus be replaced by a dialectical, processual 
analysis of how historically specific configurations of state space are produced and 
incessantly reworked through socio-political struggles (Brenner 2004, 451-452, emphasis 
added in bold). 
 
In Pakistan, the hegemonic rule of the military, faces contestations from both inside and outside 
of the state. For example, the rise of new media outlets provided an effective platform for elected 
parliamentarians and politicians to develop a counter-hegemonic discourse against the military. 
The notion of ‘independent’ judiciary and supremacy of the parliament became popular across 
broad segments of population through the expansion of electronic and digital media outlets. Prior 
to the emergence of multiple (domestic and international) media outlets and social media 
platforms, the mental state-space was monopolized by the military via the state-controlled 






75 A whole generation of millennials grew up on drama series like ‘Alpha, Bravo, Charlie’ which 
valorized and romanticized the role of military.  
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Figure 4.2. State-Spatiality in Pakistan 
 
 
The military’s hegemony has been questioned and at times even challenged after 2007 by 
institutions that had not been able to do so until then. The judiciary, parliament, and to 
some extent the media have tried to assert their independence and sovereignty over the 
public and political domain, in effect pushing the military aside and making room at the 
table for themselves (Zaidi 2014, 50). 
 
The military establishment of Pakistan has reacted to this changing political and ideological 
landscape in Pakistan. It has now entrenched itself amongst a large segment of the private (print 
and electronic) and digital media outlets. Today, the private media enterprises are highly polarized 
in terms of how they situate themselves in the civil-military imbalance within the state 
configuration. Pro-military media outlets dominate the air waves and legitimize the hegemonic 
rule of the military by downplaying the significance of ‘constitution’ and sovereignty of the 
‘parliament’ on television screens (see Sulehria 2019; Shah 2019). Moreover, the space in the 
media for dissenting voices has reduced substantially in recent years (Ali and Priest 2015). 
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Moreover, the aggressive propaganda campaigns on print, electronic and online forums by the 
media-wing of the military, Inter Service Public Relations, (ISPR) and an appointment of a 
Brigadier General as the head of ISPR signifies that the military establishment is cognizant of the 
fact that the contestation over the mental state-space is significant for its hegemony. Moreover, it 
illustrates that the hegemonic role of the military is not just a matter of colonial path dependency 
but it is maintained through a continuous contestation over the state-spaces.  
Despite facing the challenge from other state actors, the military has successfully 
maintained its hegemony over the state-society through a dispensation of a Punjab-centric 
hegemonic order in which the lower orders of the society in general, and especially, people in the 
peripheries (Balochistan, rural Sindh and KPK) of the country in particular have been 
marginalized/‘otherized’ from both the state and society. This has manifested in the form of uneven 
state-spatiality in Pakistan. That is, physical state-space is much more developed in Punjab as 
compared to other parts of the country. Punjab has disproportionately higher representation in 
social state-spaces and when it comes to mental state-spaces, Punjab’s political and cultural 
imaginaries about the state have been imposed on other parts of the country, and any divergence 
from the ‘national-security paradigm’ of the state is deemed as ‘anti-national’. 
Public sector expenditures on the development of physical state-spaces (public goods 
infrastructure) have been disproportionately higher in Punjab vis-à-vis others parts of the country. 
For example, in terms of the road networks, Punjab has the most developed networks of roads 
stretching across 107,805 kilometres and it continues to get the highest allocation of funds towards 
infrastructure development (Ministry of Finance 2015, 167). Whereas, the largest province in 
Pakistan in terms of area is Balochistan but the road networks only cover 29,655 kilometres (ibid). 
Based on these numbers the road densities are 0.52 km and 0.08 km in Punjab and Balochistan, 
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respectively. Similarly, canals, airports and railways are much more developed in Punjab as 
compared to other parts of the country. If we look at other socio-economic outcomes such as 
income, consumption, housing, access to health care facilities, schools, hospitals, sanitation, 
electricity, gas and etc., Punjab performs disproportionately better than rest of the country (UNDP 
2016). One of the most telling fact is that the best performing districts in Balochistan are 
comparable with the worst performing districts of Punjab (UNDP 2016, 48). Similarly, other 
measures of development such as concentration of industries and employment opportunities 
exhibits a similar spatial pattern (Burki and Khan 2010). 
But, how does developed physical state space facilitate the hegemonic rule of the 
military76? This is directly linked with the fact that the stronghold of the military is in Punjab, i.e. 
military recruits mainly come from northern and central Punjab (Fair and Nawaz 2010). Whereas, 
the Balochistan province is least represented in the military of Pakistan (Fair and Nawaz 2010, 16; 
Dawn 2016). This socio-spatial recruitment trend is rooted in the colonial history and dynamics of 
class-struggle in British India (Pasha 1998). Landed elites in Punjab sided with the British in 1857 
war between Moguls and the British Empire. As a reward to their loyalty, British gave land grants 
 
76 The uneven development of physical state-spaces in the postcolonial period needs to be 
contextualized against the backdrop of military’s policy to protect and reproduces it hegemonic 
rule over the state and society. During the military dictatorship of General Ayub Khan, the capital 
of the country was moved from Karachi (Sindh province) to Islamabad (northern Punjab) in 1960. 
The choice of Islamabad for the capital was not random, Islamabad happens to be right next to the 
military headquarters which were built in Rawalpindi (neighboring city to Islamabad) during the 
colonial period. There are numerous benefits of the proximity between military’s headquarters and 
the capital city, it tends to enhance the formal and informal control and command of the military 
over other state institutions such as the parliament, judiciary and other bureaucratic organs of the 
state including National Television. To execute military coup d'état which happened twice after 
1960, military personnel attacked other state institutions namely the parliament, supreme court, 
Prime Minister Office and national television, and the proximity from the military headquarters 
played an important role in the successful execution of the coup attempts.  
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to their loyalists in Punjab and recruited soldiers from Punjab in British Indian army. In fact, British 
Empire recognized soldiers from Punjab as the most reliable and trustworthy (Memon 2012). This 
colonial path dependency has continued in the postcolonial period which has further accentuated 
the disproportionately higher representation of military’s officer cadres from northern and central 
Punjab. Given the fact that military’s rank and file comes from Punjab, it is imperative for military 
as an institution to co-opt major political parties in Punjab as junior partners in this hegemonic rule 
(historic bloc). The development of physical state-spaces have allowed landed elites, merchants 
and capitalists in Punjab to accrue benefits. In return mainstream political parties in Punjab have 
provided continuous support to military’s hegemonic rule in Pakistan.  
Similarly, the ideological paradigm (mental state-space) of the ‘national-security state’ 
plays a pivotal role in military’s hegemonic rule. According to the national-security paradigm, 
Pakistan faces an existential threat from its neighbour India and this ever existing threat can only 
be countered via a strong military. Thereby, the national interest of Pakistan amalgamates into 
institutional interest of the military of Pakistan. As a consequence, allocating large share of gross 
domestic product towards defence expenditures is not a ‘choice’ but a ‘necessity’. Furthermore, 
military projects itself as an ‘Islamic’ military and India as a ‘Hindu’ country. Therefore, in 
addition to national-security narrative, military also use the ‘right-wing Islamist narrative’ to 
strengthen its legitimacy and integrity. Anyone who would ideologically disagree with the 
military’s narrative is categorized not only ‘anti-Pakistan’ but also 'anti-Islam'. The ideological 
discourse is reproduced through ‘official’ academics and media on daily basis.  
Military’s India and Islam centric ideology is primarily popular in Punjab province and has 
limited traction in other parts of the country. This can be explained by the fact that during 1947 
partition of the Indian sub-continent, Punjab was one of the provinces that was divided between 
82 
India and Pakistan and it witnessed the mass scale communal killings and religion-based 
migration. Therefore, it is relatively easier for the military to rile up support from the people in 
Punjab on ‘national security and Islam centric’ ideology. On the other hand, Balochistan and KPK 
(NWFP at the time) remained largely immune from the communal killings and mass migrations at 
time of independence. Moreover, the political parties outside of Punjab (e.g. Balochistan, Sindh 
and KPK) have been less open and receptive towards the military’s hegemonic rule. In fact, East 
Pakistan (now Bangladesh) opted for separation from the state of Pakistan due to the 
discrimination and marginalization it faced under the Punjab-centric hegemonic rule of the 
military. There have been mass scale political movements (peaceful and armed) against military’s 
Punjab centric rule in Balochistan and parts of KPK province throughout the history of Pakistan. 
Today, one of the largest grassroots movement (Pashtun Tahfuz Movement) against the military’s 
hegemonic rule has originated from parts of Balochistan and KPK province. In other words, the 
ideological hegemony of the state is weakest in Balochistan and strongest in Punjab (Surendra, 
2009; Dawn, 2015). To maintain its hegemonic rule, military rely on coercive tools to subjugate 
masses in Balochistan, parts of KPK and Sindh77.  
The reading of Lefebvre’s notion of state-spatiality in conjunction with Resnick and 
Wolff’s theory of the state makes it visible that state-spaces are sites of contestation from both 
inside and outside in Pakistan. The development of uneven state-spatiality in Pakistan also makes 
visible the fact that it is not just societal conflict (conflict external to the state) which mediates and 
regulates the state, but the society is also being affected by the internal conflict of the state. 
 
 
77 The ideological hegemony (mental state-space) of the military is highly fractured and uneven 




By drawing from Resnick and Wolff’s (1987) framework, the chapter has argued that the 
state is an active site of contestation not just between socio-economic actors but also within the 
state institutions. The latter aspect of the conflict has not been fully theorized in the Marxian 
theories of the state. Building on the case study of Pakistan, it is argued in this chapter that the 
internal conflict and contradictions within the state apparatus, i.e. the conflict between elected 
government and the military, mediate and regulate the form and character of the state. The 
particular modalities through which military has continued to reproduce its power and hegemony 
over the state and society are explained through the dynamic interplay between the ideological, 
political and economic factors.  
The chapter has made a new theoretical contribution by positing ‘uneven state-spatiality’ 
as the defining characteristic of the postcolonial state of Pakistan. The conceptual understanding 
of the postcolonial state as ‘uneven state-spatiality’ addresses inherent contradictions in the 
existing literature on the postcolonial state of Pakistan For example, Alavi’s (1972) theory of the 
over-developed state, i.e., the state apparatus (civil-military bureaucracies) is developed vis-à-vis 
the society, remains a dominant theoretical framework to conceptualize state-society 
contradictions in Pakistan. This chapter has identified inherent contradictions in Alavi’s (1972) 
theory of the ‘over-developed’ state as it cannot explain why the power asymmetry between the 
state and society varies significantly from one province to another within Pakistan. That is, how 
did an ‘underdeveloped’ society in the former East Pakistan (it became an independent Bangladesh 
in 1972) was able to overthrow the hegemonic rule of the overdeveloped state (both at the material 
and ideological levels)? Moreover, why does an ‘over-developed’ state face disproportionately 
higher resistance from Balochistan, Khbyer Pakthunkhwa (KP) and Sindh provinces as compared 
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to Punjab? The framework of uneven state-spaces presented in this chapter has addressed these 
questions in a consistent manner.  
Further, the chapter has made an intervention in the institutions versus class debate in the 
context of Pakistan. It is argued in the recent literature that class analysis has become redundant 
for the purpose of critically analyzing the postcolonial state of Pakistan because military is not just 
a hegemon but it is also a ‘multi-class’ institution. By drawing from Resnick and Wolff (1987) 
framework, the chapter has responded to this argument by illustrating that class and institutions 
are dialectically interlinked, and the top brass of the military controls the processes of surplus 
appropriation and distribution in one of the largest commercial enterprises of the country. In other 
words, the chapter has shown that the Marxian notion of class remains relevant for understanding 




5. CONCLUSION OF THREE ESSAYS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This dissertation has delineated the underlying dynamics of the processes of urban development 
by focusing on the dialectical relationships among space, class and the state. It is argued in this 
dissertation that contradictions and conflicts in postcolonial capitalism are mediated by the 
production and reproduction of socially produced spaces. For the empirical case study, the 
dissertation focused on postcolonial Pakistan. It has identified dual contradictions unfolding in 
Pakistan due to rapid urban transformations. On the one hand, urbanization has potentially opened 
up new avenues for economic development via agglomeration economies, positive externalities 
and knowledge-spillovers. At the same time, urbanization accentuated socio-economic inequities 
and conflicts, along with accelerated ecological degradation. The dissertation has argued that one 
of the main underlying factors behind urbanization is the outward expansion of the urban, i.e. the 
urban is encroaching erstwhile rural spaces. This is what is known as urban sprawl. This is directly 
tied to the political economy of land where the buying and selling of land for the real estate 
activities enjoys special tax holidays and fiscal incentives. This makes ‘urbanized’ land one of the 
most valuable asset in Pakistan and as a result erstwhile farm land, forests and green spaces are 
converted into gated housing enclaves at urban peripheries for high income households. Islamabad 
has witnessed a forty percent rise in urban sprawl in the last two decades, whereas, thirty-five 
percent of forest area has been lost during the same time period. A similar trend is observable in 
other major urban centers of Pakistan (Haque 2015). It is important to note that new housing 
societies only become feasible when new road infrastructure and other public goods (electricity, 
gas, piped water) are provisioned by the government. Thus, the provision of public goods through 
public exchequer plays a key role in making these housing societies commercially feasible. In 
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other words, profits are privatized while costs are socialized in the prevailing regime of neoliberal 
urban development78. This regime of development is successfully reproduced through a coalition 
of real estate developers, politicians and civil-military bureaucracies. Gated housing enclaves cater 
to the needs of affluent groups, and the land on which these are built is acquired by dispossessing 
local households from the land where they have been living for decades. For their survival, 
dispossessed households move into slum settlements. Not to mention, the prevailing regime of 
urban development has huge ecological costs. It has diminished biodiversity from land, increased 
carbon emissions, and polluted the environment. Air quality of Pakistan’s major urban centers is 
one of the worst in the world (Khan 2019). 
By incorporating these new empirical insights from the ground, the dissertation has 
presented a new conceptual framework of expulsionary development. It argues that the process of 
commodification and urbanization of new spaces --- ‘real subsumption of land by capital’ --- is 
one of the key strategies of capital to valorize itself in the neoliberal period. On one hand, the 
neoliberal regime of urban development implies dispossession, immiseration and constant threat 
of displacement/evictions from land, livelihoods and homes for the marginalized groups of society. 
On the other hand, it provides new opportunities for capital accumulation and consumption (gated 
housing enclaves) for owners of capital and affluent segments of the society. In short, the 
framework of expulsionary development has made visible that development and 
underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin in urban spaces of Pakistan. The dissertation has 
argued that urban vulnerabilities are created and exacerbated by the contemporary processes of 
neoliberal ‘development’. In other words, the problem is not lack of development but that the very 
 
78 In other words, urban development is a dialectic of urban affluence and vulnerabilities. Urban 
affluence is limited to the privileged few while vulnerabilities are collectively shared by the rest 
of the society. 
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process of ‘development’ is predicated on immiseration and exclusion of the working and subaltern 
groups of society.  
The role of the state is central in the processes of spatial restructuring. In the recent 
literature, the role of the state is reduced to ‘extra-economic coercion’ in the processes of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Levien 2018, 2012). This dissertation has contextualized the role 
of the state in much more nuanced way by identifying its role in the spatial restricting of the places. 
Spatial lens allows us to explain the underlying dynamics of the widespread phenomenon of 
‘dispossession without proletarianization’, i.e. capital is primarily interested in restructuring and 
commodifying new spaces rather than hiring wage labor to valorize itself. In particular, the 
dissertation has delineated the way in which the postcolonial state actively creates new rents and 
facilitates dispossession through its selective infrastructural policy that includes some places and 
excludes others. The dissertation has also delineated the manner in which space mediates the 
dialectical relationship between the state and society by synthesizing Resnick and Wolff (1987) 
framework with Henri Lefebvre’s (1970) notion of state-spatiality. It is argued that the postcolonial 
state of Pakistan can be best characterized by uneven state-spatiality. In other words, uneven 
development is not limited to the societal outcomes but it affects the postcolonial state as well.  
From the perspective of praxis, one of the key insights from this dissertation is the 
significance of the space in mediating class and institutional structures. Therefore, I argue that 
the emancipatory and progressive politics must incorporate the fight to protect spaces of 
marginalized communities from the encroachment of capital and the postcolonial state. In other 
words, the orthodox notion of class struggle over wages and work day needs to be expanded by 
incorporating the fight over the control and command over spaces in postcolonial capitalism. The 
class struggle over space is going to determine whether land is commodified for the privatized 
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interests of the few privileged segments of the society or the land is used and developed for the 
welfare of the working classes and subalterns. Moreover, in the case of postcolonial Pakistan, to 
materialize inclusive development and egalitarian distribution of resources, the power 
asymmetry in the state structure needs to be redressed, i.e. the hegemonic rule of the military 
over the state and society must be replaced by the supremacy of people’s representatives via the 
parliament and elected institutions.  
On the issue of slums, one of the major insights that has been offered by the dissertation 
is the following: the growth of slums in urban centers is not necessarily due to lack of growth in 
formal housing sector. On the contrary, the growth of high-end housing sector has exacerbated 
the growth of slums at urban peripheries. It is important to contextualize the issue of slums 
against the backdrop of the prevailing regime of uneven urban development rather than simply 
treating it as a mismatch of supply and demand of the housing stock. Therefore, I argue that the 
state needs to offer new low-income housing projects and at the same time it must enact 
restrictions on the construction of new gated housing enclaves on common land, forests and 
farmlands at urban peripheries to protect dispossession of the vulnerable segments of the society. 
Moreover, environmentally, Pakistan is among the more vulnerable countries of the region, this 
policy would help slow down the growth of urban sprawl.  
Moreover, a comprehensive urban land reforms policy is needed to ensure inclusive and 
sustainable urban development in Pakistan. Building on the works of urban planners and 
architects in Pakistan79, I identify four pillars of urban land reforms. One, a large chunk of 
government land is sitting idle which should be used to provide housing for low-income groups. 
 
79 Arif Hasan and Nausheen Anwar have talked about urban land reforms.  
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Two, a land ceiling act should be introduced which would limit that an individual cannot own 
more than 750 square meters of residential urban land. Three, to disincentivize speculation on 
vacant plots of urban land, a hefty non-utilization fee should be levied on vacant urban land. 
Four, gated housing enclaves have large size homes with low population density which has 
unfavorable socio-spatial and environmental outcomes. The minimum density for all urban 
development project should be no less than 400 persons per hectare in order to conserve land, 
protect the environment, and promote equity.  
In the near future, I plan to extend my research on slums (chapter one) by focusing on 
slum upgradation and relocation projects in the context of Pakistan. In particular, I am interested 
in analyzing employment related effects among slum households of the spatial re-location of 
slums. Pakistan is set to develop at least nine new Special Economic Zones under China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (CPEC). I plan to expand my work in chapter two (political economy of 
dispossession) by focusing on the impact of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) on local land, labor 
and produce markets in Punjab and KP provinces. Furthermore, I plan to expand my research on 
the postcolonial state (chapter three) by analyzing the impact of evolving conflict between 
Punjab based political party PML-N and the military establishment in Pakistan. Specifically, I 
would like to analyze whether a Punjab-centric hegemonic order has weakened due to the 





The Slum question and Expulsionary Urbanization 
 
Figure A.1: Sector wise share of Pakistan’s GDP, 1950-2016 
 














































































































Table A.1: Average Annual Growth rate of selected sectors in Pakistan, 1990-2015 
Sectors Annual Avg. Growth rate 
(1990-2015) 
Per capital GDP 1.3% 
Per capita output in crop 
agriculture and large-scale 
manufacturing 
0.9% 
Gross Fixed Capital formation in   
Agriculture  
3.6% 
Gross Fixed Capital formation in Large 
scale manufacturing 
0.1% 
Major crops 2.8% 
Minor crops 1.9% 
Net Exports -2.3% 











Figure A.2: Cement Output in Pakistan from 1990-2015 
 
Source: Bengali (2018: 40) 
Figure A. 3: Gini coefficient in Pakistan, 1963-2002 
Source: Anwar (2005) 
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Figure A.4: Gini Coefficient in Pakistan, 2005-2015 
 
Source: Khan (2018) 
Figure A.5: Masterplan of Islamabad 
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Figure A.6: Percentage Increase in Slum Population of selected developing countries, 1990-2010  
 
 




Figure A.7: GDP Growth Rate in Pakistan, 1951-2016 
 
 
Source: author’s own calculations  
Figure A.8: Consumer Price Index Inflation in Pakistan, 1951-2016 
 
 


















































































































Figure A.9: Unemployment rate in Pakistan, 1964-2015 
 
Source: author’s own calculations  
 
Figure A. 10 Gated Housing Enclaves in Islamabad 
 









































































































































Political Economy of Dispossession 
 


























(Lakh Rs.)  
1872  410  2744  1036  18.8  201  
1882  600  4583  1467  29.4  306  
1892  1725  12368  2142  36.7  423  
1902  2025  16893  2268  26.8  630  
1912  4000  16935  2614  29  1060  
1922  4441  19664  2938  30  1400  
 
Source: Azhar (2016b: 104). Azhar (2016b) compiled this from Census of India Punjab 
Report (1931)  
*1900 as base year to control for inflation. 
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Figure B.2: Urban sprawl in Sheikhupura District, Punjab 
 
Source: Raza et al (2016: 1586)  
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APPENDIX C 
Political Economy of Uneven State Spatiality 
 
Figure C.1: Light Intensity in Pakistan, 1999 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014:53) 
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Figure C.2: Light Intensity in Pakistan, 2010 
 
 




Figure C.3: Change in Light Intensity in Pakistan, 1999-2010 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2014:54) 
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Figure C.4: Industry shares by Districts in Pakistan, 2009 
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